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 In The Federalist Number 52, James Madison1 famously 
describes several principles of good government: 
In framing a government which is to be administered 
by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you 
must first enable the government to control the 
governed; and in the next place oblige it to control 
itself.  A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the 
primary control on the government; but experience has 
taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.2 
Madison, of course, wrote from experience.  As a delegate at the 
Constitutional Convention not too many months earlier, he and the 
other Framers had continually debated how to design a government 
that would control itself.  They spent months outlining how the three 
branches of the federal government would separate power.  They 
scrutinized myriad checks and balances that would govern the 
interrelationship of the branches.  And because of those efforts, the 
Constitution they ultimately presented to the American people 
included a vast assortment of mechanisms to protect the people’s 
liberty—it included “auxiliary precautions.” 
One such precaution was the mode of election for Senators, 
who would comprise the second branch of Congress.  Senators were 
to be elected by the legislature of the state they represented.3  This 
prescription was the subject of thoughtful, careful debate by the 
Framers. 
In the course of their debates, the Framers emphasized three 
primary arguments for prescribing state legislative election of 
Senators: (1) it would further diversify the chambers of this bicameral 
Congress, thus decreasing the likelihood of congressional action that 
infringed the people’s liberties; (2) the Senators would thereby 
 
1 This paper refers heavily to the arguments written in The Federalist Papers.  Typically, 
the author of a particular paper is specified, but at times when multiple papers of different 
authors are referred to collectively, the author is labeled as Publius.  The Federalist Papers 
are actually the composite work of three of the Founding Fathers, Alexander Hamilton (who 
organized the project), James Madison, and John Jay.  See Clinton Rossiter, Introduction to 
THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, at ix (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).  For political reasons, the Papers 
at the time were published under the collective pseudonym Publius, see id. at x–xi, thus my 
use of that name when referring to multiple papers collectively. 
2 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. 
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represent the states, which constitute a phenomenally active 
constituency for the second branch because of the states’ ability to 
gather, process, and distribute information and their natural 
inclination to oppose overreaching federal measures; and (3) it would 
result in distinguished Senators who were sufficiently independent 
from the people such that they could check the volatilities of 
democracy.  Clearly, the Framers thought things through. 
The miracle that was the Constitution4 was accompanied by 
yet another miracle, an American people who were open to the same 
type of thoughtful debate as the Framers.5  Those who opposed the 
Constitution raised a slew of arguments, old and new, against the 
document, including its Senate.  Proponents made their responses, 
and thus the American people witnessed a debate, both live and 
written, regarding a government that would change the world.  The 
American people, too, were convinced of the virtues of the 
Constitution, including its auxiliary protection of electing Senators by 
state legislatures. 
Enter the Progressives.  Unlike the Framers or the ratifiers, 
members of the Progressive Movement observed problems in the 
world around them and myopically marched straight ahead to 
implement hasty solutions.  They lived in a republic but wanted a 
democracy.  And one of their number one priorities was to alter the 
election mode for Senators—surely things would improve if the 
people directly elected their Senators. 
Opponents of this proposal raised various counterarguments, 
including those that the Founders had made over a century earlier.  
But proponents were undeterred.  That was a different time, they said.  
The Founders did the best they could with what they had, but times 
have changed.  In the Framers’ grand scheme, state legislative 
election for Senators was a hasty afterthought with little to say for it. 
The Progressive Movement prevailed: the Seventeenth 
Amendment instituted direct election for Senators.6  An auxiliary 
protection was eliminated—the results were disastrous. 
 
4 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 230–31 (James Madison) (finding evidence of divine 
guidance in the Convention’s result). 
5 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 1, at 33 (Alexander Hamilton) (describing the American people 
as in a unique moment in history “to decide the important question, whether societies of men 
are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice”). 
6 U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. 
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This Note intends to remind readers of the arguments the 
founding generation made when they selected state legislative 
election for Senators.
 7  Part I sets the stage with a brief overview of 
the movement that culminated in the Seventeenth Amendment.  Part 
II presents and analyzes the Founders’ arguments.  Part II.A argues 
that the Framers chose state legislative election for Senators because 
they intended a bicameral Congress with distinct houses.  Part II.B 
argues that they compromised to let Senators represent states and, 
having done so, recognized that state legislative elections would 
provide Senators with an optimal constituency—the States.  Part II.C 
argues that state legislative election was implemented as a means of 
producing distinguished Senators who were independent from the 
people such that they could check the people in moments of 
temporary error.  Each of these subsections also provides a brief 
assessment of the historical arguments from a modern view.  Part III 
concludes with a general warning to respect the wise, careful 
planning the Framers employed in designing America’s government. 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE PASSAGE OF THE SEVENTEENTH 
AMENDMENT 
The first proposal for direct election of senators came in 1826 
(from a House Representative, obviously), and over the next few 
decades, similar proposals surfaced now and then.8  By the mid-
 
7 As the reader is likely aware, the legal world has been embroiled in a decades-long 
debate over the proper methods for ascertaining legislative intent.  Textualists seem to have 
secured a firm foothold regarding the proper starting point for such an inquiry—the text 
itself.  See, e.g., Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 131 S. Ct. 1259, 1264 (2011).  But jurists’ 
viewpoints on a text’s ambiguity (and thus the need to proceed to extrinsic evidence) differ, 
and the legitimacy of legislative history is in question.  See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. 
Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 567–72 (2005).  As one who is persuaded by the 
textualist argument, I feel it necessary to explain a Note that delves heavily into historical 
debates and writings.  And the explanation is simple: the Constitution’s text was perfectly 
clear about the mode of election the Framers desired.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (“The 
Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by 
the Legislature thereof . . . .” (emphasis added)), amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.  
Indeed, it was Progressives’ recognition of the text’s clarity that led them to amend the text 
itself.  This Note, then, need not prove the meaning of the Framers’ text.  Instead, it focuses 
on the arguments that convinced the Framers and ratifiers to adopt the text they did. 
8 See RALPH A. ROSSUM, FEDERALISM, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE SEVENTEENTH 
AMENDMENT 194–95 (2001).  This section barely scratches the surface of the history of the 
Seventeenth Amendment.  For a more detailed review, see generally GEORGE H. HAYNES, 
THE ELECTION OF SENATORS (1906); C.H. HOEBEKE, THE ROAD TO MASS DEMOCRACY 
4
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nineteenth century, Andrew Johnson was proposing direct election as 
a Representative, and within twenty years, as President.9  And by the 
end of that century, proposals for direct election were abundant.10  
Despite the growing momentum, though, no proposed amendment 
could garner the requisite two-thirds majority in the Senate.11  In May 
of 1912, the Senate gave in,12 and one year later, the states had 
ratified the Seventeenth Amendment to the Constitution.13 
The long road to the Seventeenth Amendment included a 
great deal of debate about the state legislatures’ election of Senators 
and the advantages and disadvantages of that system. 
First,14 proponents of the Amendment argued that Senators 
were unresponsive to the people.15  Senators depended less on their 
popularity with the people than with the state legislators.16  Thus, 
when the people called for certain changes important to them, 
Senators were not always attentive.17  Indeed, some Senators were 
not even responsive to the desires of the state legislature.18  These 
conflicting interests between the Senate and House dampened 
Congress’s ability to pass necessary laws.19 
 
(1995); ROSSUM, supra, at 181–218. 
9 See ROSSUM, supra note 8, at 195. 
10 See HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 137. 
11 See, e.g., ROSSUM, supra note 8, at 210 (describing the defeat of the last failed proposal, 
that of the 61st Congress). 
12 See id. at 214. 
13 See id. at 218. 
14 For responses to the objections in this paragraph, see HOEBEKE, supra note 8; infra 
Sections II.A.2 and II.C. 
15 See HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 191. 
16 See HAYNES, supra note 8, at 168 (writing that a Senator’s election chances then 
depended on their ability to “negotiate” with the legislature). 
17 See id. at 167 (“Almost inevitably it results that [a Senator] renounces any attempt to 
keep in sensitive touch with the people.”). 
18 See id. at 168. 
19 See id. at 155 (describing the mode of senatorial election as a roadblock for 
“democracy’s consistent advance”).  An important question regarding this objection is, “ 
‘Necessary’ from whose point of view?”  If “necessary” to the people, then the objection has 
some traction (although it may not be persuasive, see infra note 137).  But if “necessary” to 
special interest groups, then the objection is unfounded.  Yet in a brilliant article, Todd 
Zywicki makes a strong case for just that.  See Todd J. Zywicki, Senators and Special 
Interests: A Public Choice Analysis of the Seventeenth Amendment, 73 OR. L. REV. 1007 
(1994).  In a classic case of Baptists and bootleggers, see Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers and 
Baptists—The Education of a Regulator Economist, 7 VIEWPOINT 12, 13 (1983), available at 
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/1983/5/v7n3-3.pdf, special 
interests were the impetus for, and greatest beneficiaries of, the Seventeenth Amendment, 
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Second, the reputation of Senate elections was tarnished by 
incidents of bribery and corruption.20  This created doubts as to the 
efficacy of state legislative elections in electing distinguished, 
upstanding Senators.21 
Third, deadlock in state legislatures on election of Senators 
had resulted in vacancies in the United States Senate.22  A switch to 
direct election would mean hundreds of thousands, or even millions, 
of voters choosing between candidates, making the likelihood of 
deadlock infinitesimally small.23 
Finally, electing Senators by state legislatures was an 
antiquated concept that had been little more than an afterthought for 
the Founders.24  They were, in fact, “comparatively indifferent as to 
the means or manner of election.”25  Guided by the lessons of history, 
the people now know how to design Congress better, and direct 
election is the right option.26 
Each of the objections above includes a footnote referencing a 
subsection of this Note and/or other sources that have provided 
responses thereto, except the last—that the Founders were 
“indifferent” toward the mode of election for Senators.  If this Note 
succeeds in convincing the reader of anything, I hope it will be that 
this final rationale was totally and utterly wrong.
 27 
 
see Zywicki, supra, at 1054. 
20 HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 91–94. 
21 See HAYNES, supra note 8, at 165–66.  For responses to this objection, see HOEBEKE, 
supra note 8, at 94–97 (demonstrating the overblown nature of the perception of corruption); 
infra Section II.C.3 (describing the Senate’s reputation as a House of distinguished 
characters). 
22 See ROSSUM, supra note 8, at 183–90.  For a discussion of why Congress, not the states, 
was to blame for this circumstance,  see id. at 183–84. 
23 See HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 90. 
24 See 46 CONG. REC. 1979 (1911) (statement of Sen. Henry Cabot Lodge) (arguing 
emphatically that the Framers were not aware “they were destroying the popular quality of 
their work” in designing the mode of election for the President and Senate). 
25 William A. Harris, The Election of Senators by the People, 52 INDEP. 1291, 1291 
(1900). 
26 S. REP. NO. 61-961, at 4 (1911) in 1 CONGRESSIONAL EDITION: VOLUME 6078, at 3 
(1911).  (“In what possible way could the mode of choosing Senators change his relations to 
the State or the people thereof?”). 
27 It is worth noting that the anti-Constitutional movement of the founding generation, the 
Anti-Federalists, would also have rejected the Seventeenth Amendment.  Their primary 
philosophical dispute was whether a republican government could govern adequately a 
nation of such size.  See HERBERT J. STORING, 1 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 15 
(Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981); id. at 15 n.*4 (listing myriad examples from the Anti-
6
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II. THE FRAMERS AND RATIFIERS’ PURPOSE 
In the heat of the moment, the proponents of the Seventeenth 
Amendment lost sight of the purpose behind the Senate’s mode of 
election.  That isn’t to say they lost sight of the founding generation’s 
intent.  They knew quite clearly that they were departing from the 
original design of the Framers.  What they lost sight of was the 
purpose of that design, the reasons it was chosen.  Their error was to 
presume they saw the whole picture and then think themselves wiser 
than their forbearers. 
The Framers and ratifiers of the Constitution hand-selected 
state legislatures as the electing bodies of Senators.28  This section 
explains in detail their purpose for doing so.  Each section is 
generally organized by: (1) a brief introduction to the topic(s), (2) 
within a topic or sub-topic, the debates that occurred at the 
Convention, accompanied by analysis, (3) within the same topic or 
sub-topic, the debates that occurred among the ratifiers of the text, 
and (4) a modern assessment of the historical arguments. 
A. The Concurrence of Two Distinct Bodies 
In his study of American democracy, Alexis de Tocqueville 
observed a striking difference between the members of the 1830 
Congress’s two houses.  Of the Representatives, Tocqueville 
described, “you feel yourself struck by the vulgar aspect of this great 
assembly.”29  He remarked at the lack of fame and prominence 
 
Federalist literature); Cecelia M. Kenyon, Men of Little Faith: The Anti-Federalists on the 
Nature of Representative Government, 12 WM. & MARY Q. 3, 6 (1955).  That philosophy 
stemmed from Montesquieu’s assertion that republics only work for small jurisdictions, and 
that larger areas require a monarchy or despot.  See MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 
124–26 (Anne M. Cohler et al eds. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1748).  Thus, 
Anti-Federalists would have rejected outright the Seventeenth Amendment’s 
democratization of government on a national scale.  See Kenyon, supra, at 43 (concluding 
that the Anti-Federalists never called for direct election of Senators because they lacked the 
faith to “extend their principles nation-wide”). 
28 See Todd Zywicki, Repeal the Seventeenth Amendment and Restore the Founders’ 
Design, 12 ENGAGE 88, 90 (2011), available at http://www.fed-
soc.org/publications/detail/ramifications-of-repealing-the-17th-amendment (“[T]he authors 
of The Federalist Papers and others believed that election of the Senate by state legislatures 
would be both a necessary and sufficient condition for . . . limiting the federal 
government.”). 
29 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 191 (Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba 
Winthrop eds., Univ. of Chicago 2000) (1835). 
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associated with these men, and even indulged in a rumor that some 
Representatives did not “know how to write correctly.”30  Yet “[t]wo 
steps away,” Tocqueville describes, “is the chamber of the Senate, 
whose narrow precincts enclose a large portion of the celebrities of 
America.”31  Unlike their House counterparts, Senators were 
“eloquent,” “distinguished,” and “well-known.”32  And “[a]ll the 
words that issue from this assembly would do honor to the greatest 
parliamentary debates of Europe.”33 
The “enormous difference” between these two houses led 
Tocqueville to ask why.34  The question was particularly puzzling 
because, unlike some European legislatures (such as the Houses of 
Commons and Lords), the ultimate electorates of both bodies enjoyed 
universal suffrage.35  Tocqueville concluded, “I see only a single fact 
that explains it: the election that produces the House of 
Representatives is direct; that from which the Senate emanates is 
subject to two stages.”36 
The circumstances observed by Tocqueville were no 
accident—America’s Founding Fathers intended for the houses of 
Congress to be as distinct as possible.37  In this way, legislative 
structure would reduce the potential for laws that infringed on the 
people’s rights.  And mode of election was one of several ways to 
ensure the houses’ distinctive characteristics.38  This section 
demonstrates the Framers’ intent for distinct Congressional houses by 
sketching the historical context and by analyzing the arguments of the 






34 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 29, at 191–92. 
35 Id. at 192. 
36 Id. 
37 See HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 173. 
38 Beyond the scope of this paper are other ways the Framers ensured that the House and 
Senate would be distinct.  These included different candidacy qualifications, term lengths, 
membership numerosity, and district size (note that even those opposed to election by state 
legislatures favored larger Senatorial districts than those of the House, see, e.g., Notes of 
James Madison (June 7, 1787), in 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 
154 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937) [hereinafter 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS] (“[Mr. James 
Wilson] was for an election by the people in large districts . . . .”)).  Compare U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 2, with id. § 3. 
8
Touro Law Review, Vol. 31 [2015], No. 2, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol31/iss2/7
2015 AUXILIARY PROTECTIONS 239 
 
1. Historical Context 
At the close of his career as a historian of American law’s 
British roots, J.R. Pole observed that, although America had imported 
a certain “ideology” from British government, American institutional 
structures were necessarily informed by the “accumulated effects” of 
America’s own “institutional memories and habits.”39  This insight is 
paramount here.  It turns out that the Framers and ratifiers did not 
often debate (at least compared to other hot-button topics) the need to 
make the House and Senate distinct.  It was not, apparently, a 
contentious point.  History explains why: The Framers and ratifiers 
took distinctness for granted because they had never known 
bicameralism to mean anything else. 
British government provides our starting point.  Parliament 
was and is a bicameral legislature divided into the House of 
Commons and House of Lords.40  As the name suggests, the House of 
Commons originated to represent freemen who lacked noble 
ancestry.41  And the House of Lords had long been comprised of the 
Lords Temporal, i.e. the barons, and the Lords Spiritual, i.e. the 
clergy.42  Although the distinctive divide between these houses was 
largely a product of history (rather than theory), the Framers knew 
well its virtues.43 
 
39 J. R. POLE, CONTRACT & CONSENT: REPRESENTATION AND THE JURY IN ANGLO–
AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 154-55 (2010). 
40 See id. at 154. 
41 MOYRA GRANT, THE UK PARLIAMENT 2 (2009).  Initially, the term “commons” referred, 
not to a parliamentary house, but a group of knights who joined King Henry III’s Great 
Council synchronous with the King’s extension of the tax burden to freemen.  Id.; J.R. 
MADDICOTT, THE ORIGINS OF THE ENGLISH PARLIAMENT, 924-1327, at 187, 199 (2010).  
During that first century or so, whenever the King summoned the commons, he would make 
his wishes known and then quickly dismiss them.  GRANT, supra.  The commoners began the 
practice of gathering in a second chamber (hence, bicameralism) and, eventually, making 
their own demands of the King in exchange for their consent to taxes.  Id.  By the mid-
fourteenth century, Britain formalized the authority of both the Lords and Commons, 
requiring the consent of both (and the Crown) for any law.  Id. at 3.  Charles Pinckney 
surveyed this history when he commenced the Convention’s debate on senatorial elections.  
See Notes of James Madison (June 25, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 38, at 
399–400. 
42 GRANT, supra note 41.  The Lords, which predated Commons, initially was comprised 
of the King’s advisors, referred to as a Great Council.  Id.  Although the bargaining power of 
the Lords had long necessitated their consent to the King’s edicts, their authority too was 
first formally legitimized in the mid-fifteenth century.  Id. at 3. 
43 See SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICA’S FIFTY-ONE CONSTITUTIONS AND THE 
CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE 136 (2012) (suggesting that the composition of Parliament, the 
9
Eisinger: Auxiliary Protections
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2015
240 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 31 
 
The Framers had also read the political philosophers of the 
Enlightenment.  Montesquieu advocated for a separation of the 
nobles and the people into separate legislative chambers.44  In this 
way, he argued, each could represent “separate views and interests” 
and provide a check on one another.45  Hume recognized the 
importance of the House of Lords in representing the nobility’s 
interests, but he viewed the institution as too weak to provide an 
adequate counterbalance to the power of the House of Commons.46  
And although Locke was seemingly indifferent toward dividing a 
legislature into separate chambers,47 he was adamant that the 
legislature represent society’s wide spectrum of distinct interests.48 
 
House of Commons and House of Lords, informed the Framers’ view of bicameralism).  
Perhaps the most famous evidence of this deep awareness is John Adams’ response to the 
criticisms of Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot.  In 1785, Turgot wrote to Dr. Richard Price, a 
known supporter of American independence, and criticized American state governments for 
dividing powers among branches.  See Letter from Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot, 
Comptroller of the Finance in France, to Dr. Price (Mar. 22, 1778), reprinted in HONORÉ-
GABRIEL DE RIQUETTI, CONSIDERATIONS ON THE ORDER OF CINCINATTUS (Samuel Romilly 
trans., 1785).  Turgot’s stance was that this division was an impetuous imitation of British 
governmental structure rendered unnecessary by the lack of a monarch.  Id.  He proposed a 
unicameral legislature as a superior alternative.  See id. (questioning the states’ decision to 
not consolidate authority into one body).  In response, John Adams published his multi-
volume treatise, A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of 
America, against the Attack of M. Turgot in His Letter to Dr. Price, Dated the Twenty-
Second Day of March, 1778.  JOHN ADAMS, 1 A DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF 
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, AGAINST THE ATTACK OF M. TURGOT IN 
HIS LETTER TO DR. PRICE, DATED THE TWENTY-SECOND DAY OF MARCH, 1778, 3–4 (3d ed. 
1797).  Adams argued that Turgot was in error, id., and, in the words of J.R. Pole, 
“ransacked ancient history and the Old World to prove that true republican principles had 
never been safe, and had never lasted long, without the resort of a second chamber.”  POLE, 
supra note 39, at 169. 
44 MONTESQUIEU, supra note 27, at 159-60. 
45 Id.  Publius never cites Montesquieu for this particular proposition (again, historically, 
the idea of distinct bodies was not controversial) but does for, among others, the concept of 
the separation of powers.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 301–03 (James Madison). 
46 See DAVID HUME, ESSAYS: MORAL, POLITICAL AND LITERARY 44 (Oxford Univ. Press 
1963) (1741).  Publius was certainly familiar with Hume’s writings.  See THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 85, at 527 (Alexander Hamilton). 
47 See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 159 163 (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale 
Univ. Press 2003) (1690) (referring to the legislative power “whether placed in one or more” 
houses). 
48 See id. at 164 (“[I]n well ordered commonwealths, where the good of the whole is so 
considered, as it ought, the legislative power is put into the hands of divers [sic] persons . . . 
.”).  Locke certainly seemed to have no qualms with Parliament’s bicameral choice.  See id. 
(describing the legislative body of “divers [sic] persons” as potentially sharing the legislative 
power).  But his indifference contrasts starkly with Montesquieu, who argued that combining 
the representatives of the nobles and those of the people would swallow the interests of the 
10
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The governments of colonies provide further context.  During 
the decades immediately preceding the Revolutionary War,49 eleven 
of the thirteen original colonies had bicameral legislatures (Delaware 
and Pennsylvania did not).50  The lower houses were modeled after 
the House of Commons and elected by the people.51  The 
composition of the upper houses (called “councils”) varied depending 
on the particular colony’s categorization, which might be royal, 
proprietary, or popular.52  Two of the three popular colonies 
(Connecticut and Rhode Island) elected their councils by popular 
vote, but the third colony’s (Massachusetts’) council was elected by 
its lower house, and all of the remaining colonies’ councils were 
appointed by the King or proprietor respectively.53  And regardless of 
the mode of election, all colonial councils constituted an aristocratic 
body that defended the royal interests.54 
After declaring independence, most states reassessed their 
governmental structure, including the legislature.55  After a small 
shuffle on the cameral front, eleven of the thirteen states moved 
forward with bicameral legislatures.56  But of course, the councils 
(some now renamed as “senates”)57 could no longer depend upon 
 
nobles (who comprise, almost by definition, a minority).  MONTESQUIEU, supra note 27, at 
160. 
49 Focusing on these decades accomplishes two purposes.  First, it highlights the 
governments with which the founding generation was most familiar.  Second, it sets aside 
the complexities associated with those less relevant years, including Pennsylvania’s 
transition to unicameralism in 1701, PEVERILL SQUIRE, THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN 
LEGISLATURES 23 (2012), Georgia’s transition from unicameralism in 1755, id., and the 
annexation of various colonies into what we now refer to as the “thirteen original colonies,” 
id. at 13 tbl.2.1 & nn.d–e. 
50 Jay S. Bybee, Ulysses at the Mast: Democracy, Federalism, and the Sirens’ Song of the 
Seventeenth Amendment, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 500, 507 (1997); see also SQUIRE, supra note 49 
(“[B]icameralism . . . became the established norm in the colonies.”). 
51 Bybee, supra note 50. 
52 See id. 
53 Id.; see also SQUIRE, supra note 49, at 13 tbl.2.1. 
54 Bybee, supra note 50. 
55 See SQUIRE, supra note 49, at 83 (explaining that eleven of the thirteen colonies chose 
to draft new constitutions, with Connecticut and Rhode Island continuing under their popular 
charters). 
56 Id. at 84 tbl.3.1.  Delaware transitioned to a bicameral legislature, and Georgia 
transitioned (back) to a unicameral legislature.  Id. at 84 tbl.3.1, 86.  Although the large 
majority of states simply retained their legislature’s bicameralism, Pole emphasizes that 
these constitutional designs were the product of conscious decisions based on experience.  
POLE, supra note 39, at 160. 
57 SQUIRE, supra note 49, at 84 tbl.3.1. 
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royal appointment for their membership, and the royalty no longer 
provided a constituency for senators.  The various states 
accommodated this shift differently.  Georgia reversed course and 
implemented a unicameral legislature.58  Several states retained their 
bicameral legislatures but restricted the popular electorate of the 
upper house through certain property requirements,59 an attempt to 
recreate the natural class division the royalty previously constituted.60  
Some states replaced the royal constituency with other government 
bodies.  South Carolina’s lower house began to elect its upper 
house’s members.61  Most uniquely of all, Maryland elected its 
senators through an electoral college.62  The college was comprised 
of two electors from each county and one elector each from 
Baltimore and Annapolis.63  The college then elected fifteen senators, 
with a mandate that nine reside on the western shore of the 
Chesapeake Bay and six on the eastern shore.64 
 
58 Id.  Although according to Noah Webster, a proponent of the Constitution, the people of 
the state quickly discovered the “inconveniences” of that shift.  A CITIZEN OF AMERICA 
(PSEUDONYM OF NOAH WEBSTER), AN EXAMINATION INTO THE LEADING PRINCIPLES OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (1787), reprinted in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 134 
(Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993) [hereinafter 1 DEBATE]. 
59 HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 38.  The five states were Massachusetts, New York, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, and North Carolina.  Id. 
60 See POLE, supra note 39, at 159 (“[The upper house] had been a much weaker branch of 
the government than either the governor or the assembly; it had not established any very 
distinct legitimation for its existence in a society formally lacking in social differentiation.”); 
id. at 161 (“Constitution makers were deliberately striving to use existing institutional forms 
for the representation of social elements not far removed from class interests, which had 
never been previously defined as fitting into distinct institutions . . . .”).  Because land was so 
abundant, property ownership failed to create any meaningful difference between these state 
houses.  See HOEBEKE, supra note 8; POLE, supra note 39, at 163.  The Framers recognized 
that failure and frequently cited Massachusetts’ troubles to evidence the evils of popular 
passions.  See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, at 448 (Alexander Hamilton) (explaining that 
the rebellious attitude exhibited in Shays’ Rebellion “embrace[d] a large proportion of the 
community” and that one “might expect to see the representation of the people tainted with 
the same spirit”). 
61 SQUIRE, supra note 49, at 82. 
62 See MD. CONST. OF 1776, art. XIV, XV, available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/ma02.asp. 
63 Id. art. XIV. 
64 Id. art. XV.  Senators served five-year terms.  See id. art. XIV (providing that senatorial 
elections take place every fifth year).  Maryland’s senate became a model for its US 
counterpart.  See Notes of James Madison (June 12, 1787), infra note 292, at 218–19 
(statement of James Madison) (recognizing the similarity between the Maryland Senate and 
the proposed US Senate and recommending that the Committee continue to follow 
Maryland’s example); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 242 (James Madison) (describing 
12
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Lastly, it is important to keep in mind the national 
government structure the Framers chose to leave behind—the 
Confederation.  The Articles of Confederation prescribed a 
government for member states (not people).65  Accordingly, the 
Articles provided for state legislatures to direct the selection of 
representatives in the Continental Congress.66  And not surprisingly 
at all, that Congress was unicameral.67 
In sum, the founding generation grew up among institutions 
and theories that treated bicameralism as sensible only if the resultant 
houses were distinct from each other.  This context informs the 
distinguishing characteristics they chose for the United States Senate. 
2. Founders’ Arguments 
As explained above, the concept of distinct houses in a 
bicameral legislature was not terribly controversial among the 
Founders.68  The arguments tended to regard, first, whether the 
national legislature ought to be bicameral at all and, second, if so, to 
what degree the distinction ought to be pressed. 
 
some similarities); THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, at 388 (James Madison); infra notes 322–329 
and accompanying text.  Admittedly, Delaware and Virginia did not assign distinct 
constituencies to the different houses of their bicameral legislatures.  HOEBEKE, supra note 8, 
at 38.  But by virtue of their exceptional nature, these states tend to prove the rule.  What’s 
more, these states did differentiate their houses by number (and, thus, district size) as well as 
term length.  See SQUIRE, supra note 49, at 84 tbl.3.1.  Indeed, to the degree their legislative 
houses were similar, these states only became an example of how a legislature ought not to 
be designed.  See POLE, supra note 39, at 168 (“Thomas Jefferson and James Madison 
agreed in finding the two houses in their own state of Virginia too homogeneous with each 
other . . . .”). 
65 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, pmbl. (prefacing the Articles as “[b]etween the 
states”); id. art. V (referring to Congress’s convening as a “meeting of the States”); see also 
POLE, supra note 39, at 165 (“The old Congress was in essence a meeting of sovereign states 
. . . .”). 
66 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. V, para. 1. 
67 Id.  More striking still, but beyond the scope of this paper, was that Congress 
constituted the national government in its entirety.  The Articles provided for neither an 
executive nor courts. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781; see also THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 38, at 238 (James Madison) (“Is it improper and unsafe to intermix the different powers 
of government in the same body of men? Congress, a single body of men, are the sole 
depositary of all the federal powers.”). 
68 Even a staunch advocate of unicameralism like Republicus acknowledged that 
bicameralism, if accepted, requires distinctness between the chambers.  See Republicus, 
Essay, KY. GAZETTE (Lexington), Feb. 16, 1788, reprinted in 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST 164 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) (writing that “no man” would support a 
second chamber composed of “identical” legislators). 
13
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Although we now take our bicameral Congress for granted, 
the matter was hardly settled when the Constitutional Convention 
delegates convened in 1787.  Recall that the delegates’ commission 
was to revise the Articles of Confederation,69 and that the Articles 
already provided for a unicameral legislature composed of state 
representatives.70  Indeed, the New Jersey Plan, proposed three weeks 
into the Convention, suggested that Congress retain its unicameral 
nature but be granted additional powers.71  Proponents argued 
(publicly) that their alternative was more amenable to the will of the 
people.72  The people, they claimed, had no issue with Congress’s 
structure, only its inefficacy, and the remedy for the latter was 
augmented power.73  To meddle with the structure by dividing the 
legislature into two branches was unnecessary because (1) the 
passions of political parties were absent at the national level, thus 
obviating the need for a check on those passions, and (2) if any check 
was needed, the state representatives themselves provided it.74  If the 
reasoning appears weak, it is.75  The proponents’ real concern was 
preserving state sovereignty through per-state Congressional voting.76 
 
69 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 40, at 247–48 (James Madison).  See generally ARTICLES OF 
CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. XIII (providing for amendments of the Articles). 
70 See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text. 
71 See Notes of James Madison (June 15, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 38, 
at 242–45. 
72 See id. at 251 (stating that the people were not complaining about Congress but only 
wished it to have more power). 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 As to the first point, the Framers generally were shortsighted in ignoring the potential 
for national political parties.  See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of 
Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2320 (2006) (“[T]he Framers had attempted 
to design a ‘Constitution Against Parties.’  But the futility of this effort quickly became 
apparent.” (footnote omitted)).  But as to the second point, suggesting that a governmental 
branch is its own best check, borders on the absurd (indicating the New Jersey Plan’s 
proponents were probably making any argument that came to mind in an attempt to preserve 
state power).  The argument conflates the concern that any particular state might accumulate 
too much power, in which case the other states could provide a check, with Congress’s 
accumulating too much power, in which case its own members necessarily lacked such a 
check.  Cf.  Notes of James Madison (June 19, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 
38, at 317–18 (detailing instances of the states’ infringements on one another’s sovereignty 
under the Articles of Confederation). 
76 See Notes of James Madison (June 15, 1787), supra note 71, at 251 (recounting the 
small states’ prior hesitancy in joining the Confederation and their ultimate agreement on 
condition of equal sovereignty in Congress).  Private communications provide yet greater 
evidence that state sovereignty was the true issue.  See id. at 242 n.* (John Dickinson, of 
14
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Nonetheless, the transition toward bicameralism was accepted 
rather quickly once the Convention began.  The first step towards 
acceptance actually preceded the Convention’s commencement: 
while waiting for other delegates to arrive, Madison and his fellow 
Virginians prepared fifteen resolutions for the national government.77  
And one of those fifteen proposed a bicameral legislature in which 
the people elected a House of Representatives, and the House in turn 
elected the Senate.78  Virginia proposed its Virginia Plan as soon as 
the Convention had settled on some internal rules,79 and by thus 
seizing the agenda, the Virginians finessed their fellow delegates into 
a summer of debates that revolved around those fifteen resolutions.80 
The fight for bicameralism depended on more than seizing the 
agenda.  The Plan benefitted greatly from the endorsement of some of 
the Convention’s stars, most notably George Washington and 
Benjamin Franklin.81  Moreover, these men were convinced by the 
 
Delaware, to Madison at the time of the New Jersey Plan’s proposal: “[Y]ou see the 
consequence of pushing things too far.  Some of the members from the small States wish for 
two branches in the General Legislature . . . ; but we would sooner submit to a foreign 
power, than submit to be deprived of an equality of suffrage, in both branches of the 
legislature . . . .”). 
77 DAVID O. STEWART, THE SUMMER OF 1787, at 37–38, 52–53 (2007). 
78 Notes of James Madison (May 29, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 38, at 
20 (Fourth Resolution). 
79 STEWART, supra note 77, at 50–52. 
80 For the next two weeks, literally every debate regarded the Virginia Plan because the 
delegates reconstituted as a Committee of the Whole, a parliamentary fiction comprised of 
the same delegates but geared toward discussion, solely to consider the Plan and make 
recommendations (to themselves) for consideration when they again sat as the Convention.  
See STEWART, supra note 77, at 53–54.  But even when the Convention sat again, it had to 
consider the Committee’s recommendations, and it largely did so for the balance of the 
summer.  See, e.g., Journal (June 25, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 38, at 395 
(documenting that the Convention voted to accept the fourth resolution of the Virginia Plan 
as found in the Committee of the Whole’s report). 
81 See, e.g., STEWART, supra note 77, at 37–38 (including Washington among the 
Virginians who drafted the Plan).  Although Franklin himself preferred a unicameral 
legislature, see Notes of James Madison (May 31, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra 
note 38, at 48, his greater objective was to see that the Convention draft a successful 
proposal, see id. at 111–12 (reporting Franklin’s proposed “Great Compromise”), and for 
strong evidence that Franklin considered the ultimate result a success, see K. [a pseudonym 
for Benjamin Franklin], Letter to the Editor, FEDERAL GAZETTE (Phila.), Apr. 8, 1788, in 2 
THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 401–05 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993) [hereinafter 2 
DEBATE].  James Madison, Goeverneur Morris, and James Wilson were also supportive stars 
(indeed, Wilson instigated the Three-Fifths-Clause Compromise in an attempt to succeed in 
transforming the federal government), though of somewhat lesser statures.  See Notes of 
James Madison (June 19, 1787), supra note 38, at 314–22 (recording Madison’s lengthy 
attack on the New Jersey Plan and defense of the Virginia alternative); Notes of James 
15
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arguments. James Wilson summarized those arguments in his 
passionate defense of the Virginia Plan: “If the Legislative authority 
be not restrained, there can be neither liberty nor stability; and it can 
only be restrained by dividing it within itself, into distinct and 
independent branches. In a single house there is no check . . . .”82  
The Virginia Plan,83 and bicameralism,84 triumphed at the 
Convention. 
During the period of ratification, critics of the Convention’s 
proposal largely ignored the question of bicameralism.85  Indeed, in 
 
Madison (May 30, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 38, at 33 (noting that Morris 
seconded the motion to begin consideration of the Virginia Plan’s first three proposals); 
Notes of James Madison (June 16, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 38, at 252–
55 (recording Wilson’s floor speech in which he compared the two Plans in an effort to 
demonstrate the Virginia Plan’s superiority).  Alexander Hamilton rounded out the 
delegates’ household names; his infamous, day-long Convention speech railed against the 
Virginia Plan (as well as the New Jersey Plan), but only because he found that it failed to go 
far enough—he proposed the British model as the “best in the world.”  Notes of James 
Madison (June 18, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 38, at 288; see also id. at 
291 (recording Hamilton’s proposed government structure, which began with dividing the 
legislative power into two bodies). 
82 Notes of James Madison (June 16, 1787), supra note 38, at 254. 
83 Journal (June 19, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 38, at 313 (reporting that 
the Committee of the Whole voted to recommend the Virginia Plan over the New Jersey 
Plan by a count of 7-3, with 1 divided). 
84 Journal (May 31, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 38, at 45–46.  The 
Convention’s ultimate vote on the question of bicameralism broke down as 9-2, Journal 
(June 25, 1787), supra note 80, at 395, with Virginia and Pennsylvania against, see infra 
note 111. 
85 See, e.g., Luther Martin, “The Genuine Information” I, MD. GAZETTE (Balt.), Dec. 28, 
1787, reprinted in 1 DEBATE, supra note 58, at 636 (criticizing Committee’s 
recommendation of proportional representation in both branches, but making no comment on 
creating two branches); Samuel Spencer, Speech Regarding the Powers of Senate at the 
North Carolina Ratifying Convention (July 28, 1788), in 2 DEBATE, supra note 81, at 879–81 
(acknowledging the Senate as a second branch of the legislature and criticizing, instead, its 
shared executive power with the President in appointing officers).  Compare Melancton 
Smith & Alexander Hamilton, Debate Regarding Representation, Aristocracy, and Interests 
at the New York Ratifying Convention (June 21, 1788), in 2 DEBATE, supra note 81, at 772 
(Hamilton: arguing that the division of the legislature into separate houses aids in preserving 
the people’s liberty), with id. at 774 (Smith: responding to Hamilton’s federalism argument 
but making no comment on the point of bicameralism).  Many Anti-Federalists were 
specifically in favor of bicameralism.  See, e.g., A FEDERAL REPUBLICAN (1787), reprinted in 
3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 70 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981); Brutus, Essay XVI, 
N.Y. JOURNAL, Apr. 10, 1788, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 287–88 
(Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) [hereinafter Brutus XVI]; Letter XI from the Federal Farmer to 
the Republican (Jan. 10, 1788) [hereinafter Federal Farmer XI], in An Additional Number of 
Letters from the Federal Farmer to the Republican Leading to a Fair Examination of the 
System of Government Proposed by the Late Convention; To Several Essential and 
Necessary Alternations in It; And Calculated to Illustrate and Support the Principles and 
16
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his immensely influential pamphlet An Examination into the Leading 
Principles of the Federal Constitution, Noah Webster wrote that 
bicameralism “ha[d] so many advocates in America, that it needs not 
any vindication.”86  But this apparent concession did not stop 
proponents of the Constitution from extolling bicameralism’s virtues. 
Webster himself went on to argue that, in separating the two 
chambers, bicameralism effectively isolates whatever particular 
passion or influence might seize one or the other body.87  And if that 
passion results in a bill, the uninfluenced branch can check the 
measure by voting it down.88  This point was echoed forcefully in a 
successive publication, The Federalist, the influence of which has 
become timeless: “In republican government, the legislative authority 
necessarily predominates.  The remedy for the inconveniency is to 
divide the legislature into different branches . . . .”89  Another 
 
Positions Laid Down in the Preceding Letters (1788), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST, supra, at 287–88.  But see Republicus, supra note 68, at 164–65 (arguing that a 
unicameral legislature is superior because it fills its role about as well as a bicameral one but 
with far less cost and inconsistency); Luther Martin, The Genuine Information Delivered to 
the Legislature of the State of Maryland Relative to the Proceedings of the General 
Convention Lately Held at Philadelphia, in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST , supra, at 
44–45 (arguing that only the states should be represented in the federal government, making 
only one house necessary). 
86 A CITIZEN OF AMERICA, supra note 58, at 130; see also id. at 147 (“Luckily this 
objection has no advocates but in Pennsylvania; and even here their number is dwindling. . . .  
The division of the legislature . . . will be deemed, by nineteen-twentieths of the Americans, 
one of the principal excellencies of the constitution.”). 
87 See id. at 131–32; see also id. at 133–34 (contrasting the superior governance of 
Maryland and Connecticut, the legislatures of which were bicameral, with those of 
Pennsylvania, the legislature of which was unicameral). 
88 Id. at 131; see also Benjamin Rush, Extract of a Letter from Dr. Rush, of Philadelphia, 
Lately Received by Gentleman [David Ramsay] of This City, COLUMBIAN HERALD 
(Charleston), Apr. 19, 1788, reprinted in 2 DEBATE, supra note 81, at 417–18 (“I have the 
same opinion with the antifederalists of the danger of trusting arbitrary power to any single 
body of men; but no such power will be committed to our new rulers.  Neither the house of 
representatives, [nor] the senate . . . can perform a single legislative act by themselves.”); 
Simeon Baldwin, Speech at New Haven (July 4, 1788), in 2 DEBATE, supra note 81, at 521 
(praising the Congress as a “most perfect legislature” that possessed “all those checks which 
are necessary” to ensure “due deliberation”).  The argument is reminiscent of James 
Wilson’s defense of the Virginia Plan at the Convention, see supra text accompanying note 
82, which Wilson himself renewed while supporting Pennsylvania’s ratification, see James 
Wilson, Speech in Response to William Findley at the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention 
(Dec. 1, 1787), in 1 DEBATE, supra note 58, at 823 [hereinafter Wilson’s Response] (“[T]he 
most useful restraint upon the legislature, because it operates constantly, arises from the 
division of its power, among two branches . . . .”); see also id. at 824. 
89 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 2, at 322; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, supra 
note 64, at 386 (“[T]he danger [of representatives betraying the people] will be evidently 
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argument that began to surface was that, assuming (as proponents 
were happy to do) that Congress would have a House that answered 
frequently to the people, a steadier second branch was necessary to 
infuse Congress with the benefits of experience, custom, and 
professionalism.90  Such steadiness was of particular importance for 
maintaining foreign relations,91 an area in which the Confederation 
currently was failing miserably.92 
Although the debate over making the legislature bicameral 
was contentious, the proponents of bicameralism were the clear 
victors.  Among these proponents, though, the debate regarding the 
degree of distinctness was more even-handed, at least in regard to the 
mode of election.93 
The Virginia Plan may have successfully secured a foothold 
on the issue of bicameralism but not regarding its resolution that the 
Senate be elected by the House: the Committee of the Whole’s94 first 
encounter with the resolution was to reject it.95  The next week, John 
Dickinson returned to the issue, moving that the Senate be elected by 
 
greater where the whole legislative trust is lodged in the hands of one body of men than 
where the concurrence of separate and dissimilar bodies is required in every public act.”); id. 
at 387–88 (“Without exerting the means of corruption with equal success on the House of 
Representatives, the opposition of that co-equal branch would inevitably defeat [any] attempt 
[by the Senate to form a ‘tyrannical aristocracy.’]”). 
90 See A CITIZEN OF AMERICA, supra note 58, at 132; THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, at 379–80 
(James Madison); Alexander Hamilton, Speech Regarding the Senate at the New York 
Ratifying Convention (June 24, 1788), in 2 DEBATE, supra note 81, at 796 [hereinafter 
Hamilton Regarding the Senate]. 
91 Hamilton Regarding the Senate, supra note 90; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, supra 
note 89, at 382–83 (arguing that the United States must present a “national character” to 
foreign nations, which the Senate can provide); THE FEDERALIST NO. 64, at 391–92 (John 
Jay) (considering the Senate an able body for exercising the treaty power). 
92 See generally DAVID J. BEDERMAN, THE CLASSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 164 (2008) (describing various reasons the United States’ reputation 
internationally was at the time “nothing less than atrocious”).  Wilson had raised this point 
briefly at the Convention.  See Notes of James Madison (June 26, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S 
RECORDS, supra note 38, at 426 (arguing that Britain’s refusal to enter into a commercial 
treaty with America was evidence of the need for a stable, respectable second branch). 
93 Again, many of the distinguishing features between the House and Senate are beyond 
the scope of this paper.  See supra note 38.  Publius engaged in a spirited debate regarding 
term length.  Compare THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, supra note 90, at 378–83 and THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 63, supra note 64, at 383–84, 387–90, with BRUTUS VXI, supra note 85, at 
444.  However, membership numerosity, as we will see, was inextricably intertwined with 
mode of election.  See infra note 105. 
94 See supra note 80. 
95 Journal (May 31, 1787), supra note 84, at 46. 
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the state legislatures.96  The stances of the Framers can be placed 
along a spectrum.  On one end, James Wilson was opposed to any 
arrangement except popular election for the Senate.97  His two basic 
arguments were, first, the people were sovereign, and the government 
ought to originate from them directly, and second, creating distinctive 
houses would result in “dissensions” between them.98  Surely the 
delegates unanimously agreed with Wilson as to people’s sovereignty 
(even the monarch-loving Hamilton supported that point99).100  But as 
to whether the sovereign people should directly choose both houses, 
the delegates were in disagreement.  Many supported election by 
some different body.101  Some, like Elbridge Gerry, argued that an 
indirect election was necessary to temper the people’s volatility.102  
And some others, including Dickinson, Roger Sherman, and George 
Mason, supported the motion specifically because they advocated 
 
96 Journal (June 7, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 38, at 148.  Roger 
Sherman seconded the motion.  Id. 
97 Notes of James Madison (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 151.  Wilson ultimately 
reconciled with the Committee’s decision on mode of election.  See James Wilson, Opening 
Address at the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Nov. 24, 1787), in 1 DEBATE, supra note 
58, at 795–96 (arguing that Congress will more adequately represent the people, i.e., 
sovereign, than does Parliament); Wilson’s Response, supra note 88, at 823 (“[T]here are 
two sources from which the representation is drawn, though they both ultimately flow from 
the people.” (emphasis added)).  It is anyone’s guess how he would have viewed the 
Seventeenth Amendment. 
98 Notes of James Madison (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 151. 
99 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 152 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The fabric of the 
American empire [i.e. the Constitution] ought to rest on the solid basis of THE CONSENT OF 
THE PEOPLE.”). 
100 And just as surely did the other delegates (with the exception, perhaps, of Gouverneur 
Morris, see Notes of James Madison (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 151 (seconding 
Wilson’s motion)) disagree with Wilson’s caution against “dissensions” between the 
branches; indeed, that was the whole point of bicameralism.  See Terry Smith, Rediscovering 
the Sovereignty of the People: The Case for Senate Districts, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1, 23 (1996) 
(“Dissension between the House and the Senate was exactly what the Framers desired.”).  
Dickinson’s response is almost comical: “The objection is that [‘]you attempt to unite 
distinct Interests[’]—I do not consider this an objection, Safety may flow from this variety of 
Interests . . . .”  Notes of Rufus King (June 7, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 
38, at 158–59. 
101 HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 44 (noting George Read wanted executive appointment and 
Hamilton suggested an electoral college with life tenure).  Even Madison was open to “other 
channel[s].”  See Notes of Madison (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 154 (statement of James 
Madison). 
102 Notes of James Madison (June 7, 1787), note 38, at 152 (statement of Elbridge Gerry) 
(stating that indirect election would result in Senators who could provide a check against the 
people).  For further development of this theme, see supra Section II.C. 
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retaining some form of state representation in Congress.103  
Madison’s view fell somewhere in the middle, although he had no 
objection to state legislatures on principle;104 his concern for keeping 
the Senate body small led him to argue for some other way of 
restraining democratic fervor.105 
As much as the arguments regarding state legislature election 
were balanced and varied, the ultimate vote by the Committee was 
 
103 See, e.g., Notes of James Madison (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 150 (statement of 
John Dickinson).  For further development of this theme, see supra Section II.B. 
104 See Notes of James Madison (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 154 (statement of James 
Madison) (arguing that the delegates should see if a better option exists).  The statement was 
likely one of conciliation and compromise; Madison, and many others, believed the states 
deserved a majority of the blame for the Confederation’s failings.  See STEWART, supra note 
77, at 19; THE FEDERALIST NO. 85, supra note 46, at 521–22 (accusing the state governments 
of “undermin[ing] the foundations of property and credit” and “plant[ing] mutual distrust in 
the breast of all classes of citizens.”); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, supra note 90, at 377 
(conceding only that state legislature election was “probably the most congenial with the 
public opinion”).  James Wilson ended up in a bit of a shouting match with John Dickinson 
as to whether Wilson hoped to eliminate the states.  Compare Notes of James Madison (June 
7, 1787), supra note 38, at 152-53 (statement of John Dickinson), with id. at 153 (statement 
of James Wilson). 
105 See Notes of James Madison (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 154 (statement of James 
Madison); see also Notes of James Madison (May 29, 1787), supra note 78, at 20 (Virginia 
Plan) (resolving that the second chamber should be elected by the first).  Madison’s 
numerosity concerns warrant a brief explanation.  Recall that the Virginia Plan included a 
resolution that both houses of Congress would have proportional representation (whereas the 
sole branch of the Continental Congress had equal representation, ARTICLES OF 
CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. V, para. 1).  See Notes of James Madison (May 29, 1787), 
supra note 78, at 20.  As the Committee debated the Senate’s mode of election, the members 
viewed the discussion through that lens.  Proportional representation, though, forced a trade-
off between a small Senate and election by state legislatures.  Notes of James Madison (June 
7, 1787), supra note 38, at 152 (editorial insertion by Farrand); see also id. at 151 (statement 
of James Madison) (“[I]f the motion (of Mr. Dickenson [sic]) should be agreed to, we must 
either depart from the doctrine of proportional representation; or admit into the Senate a very 
large number of members.”); Notes of James Madison (June 25, 1787), supra note 41, at 408 
(stating that the large states viewed election by state legislatures “as opposed” to 
proportional representation).  As Charles Pinckney pointed out early in the debate, to allot 
Rhode Island, the smallest state, just one Senator would mean a Senate membership that 
numbered at least eighty.  See Notes of James Madison (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 150 
(statement of John Dickinson).  Madison perhaps would have accepted Dickinson’s proposal 
if it allowed for a small Senate, but because the sizes and populations of states varied so 
much, only equal representation could reconcile state legislative election with a small 
Senate.  Thus, Madison argued for some other mode.  See Notes of James Madison (June 7, 
1787), supra note 38, at 154 (statement of James Madison).  Interestingly, John Dickinson 
not only accepted the trade-off but welcomed it, stating that he hoped for a large Senate,  
Notes of James Madison (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 150 (statement of John 
Dickinson), a view not shared by any other delegate. 
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not: Dickinson’s proposal passed unanimously.106  The vote is all the 
more remarkable when compared to a fractured vote just the previous 
day rejecting a similar proposal to elect the House of Representatives 
through state legislatures.107  It’s difficult to know why the vote came 
out the way it did. Perhaps (but not likely) the proponents’ arguments 
found their mark;108 perhaps the most vocal opponents, Madison and 
Wilson,109 were in actuality a small minority; or perhaps (most likely) 
the delegates realized that the greater issue by far was the debate over 
proportional or equal representation—election by state legislatures 
mattered little in comparison.110  Whatever the reason(s) behind it, the 
unanimous vote settled the issue with force111: the proposed 
 
106 Journal (June 7, 1787), supra note 96, at 149.  The vote is particularly curious because 
James Wilson first moved that the question be postponed as the Committee considered his 
own proposal for direct election, Notes of James Madison (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 
151 (statement of James Wilson), yet that measure failed, Journal (June 7, 1787), supra note 
96, at 148–49.  For reasons we cannot fully know, a large majority of the delegates wanted to 
settle the issue right then. 
107 Journal (June 6, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 38, at 130 (rejecting by 
vote of 3-8). 
108 The indelible George Mason had the last (powerful) word before the vote.  See Notes 
of James Madison (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 155–56 (statement of George Mason). 
109 In advocating for ratification of the Constitution, both men eventually found 
themselves arguing for the provision.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, supra note 90, at 377; 
James Wilson, (Nov. 24, 1787), in 1 DEBATE, supra note 97, at 795-96 (referencing Wilson’s 
shift in attitude).  From the start, Madison’s opposition was subordinate to other concerns 
(again, his greater concern was numerosity, see supra note 105 and accompanying text), and 
he borrowed Dickinson’s analogy of the solar system—with the states as planets—the very 
next day.  Compare Notes of James Madison (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 153 
(statement of John Dickinson), with Notes of James Madison (June 8, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S 
RECORDS, supra note 38, at 165 (statement of James Madison). 
110 I draw this conclusion from comments made during this debate, see Notes of James 
Madison (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 151 (Pierce Butler: declining to give an opinion 
until the ratio of representation was determined), but especially those made when senatorial 
election was revisited before the Convention, see, e.g., Notes of James Madison (June 25, 
1787), supra note 41, at 407 (Madison: moving to postpone decision on the mode of election 
and take up the issue of representation in the Senate).  The issue of representation in the two 
branches later occupied the Convention for several weeks, Notes of James Madison (June 
27, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 38, at 436 n.2, and nearly ended it, see 
generally MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 94 
(1913) (quoting Gouverneur Morris as stating, “the fate of America was suspended by a 
hair”); STEWART, supra note 77, at 125 (quoting Charles Pinckney as stating, “had the 
Convention separated without determining upon a plan, it would have been on this point”). 
111 Although Virginia and Pennsylvania reversed their stance after equal representation 
was looking more likely, see Notes of James Madison (June 25, 1787), supra note 41, at 408 
n.* (inserting a note immediately after recording the vote to explain that the large states 
viewed election by state legislatures “as opposed” to proportional representation), the point 
still carried by a strong majority (9-2), Journal (June 25, 1787), supra note 80, at 395. 
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Constitution upon which the ratifiers deliberated elected its Senators 
by state legislatures.112 
The ratifiers heard significant discussion regarding the 
distinctness of the Senate.  Some lamented that the second branch 
would not constitute a more direct representation of the people.113  
Others understood the need for some removal from the people but 
argued that the Convention delegates, in empowering state 
legislatures to elect Senators, had overcompensated.114 
But proponents of the Constitution prevailed.  Wilson found it 
particularly necessary to detail the benefits of bicameralism, as some 
Pennsylvanians were quite fond of their state’s unicameral 
legislature.115  He first responded to critics by reminding them that 
both branches “ultimately flow[ed] from the people” and that the 
Framers had remembered the people by instituting a popular branch 
in the House.116  But setting all that aside, the genius of distinct 
bodies was their increased ability to check each other.117  Bills passed 
under the influence of a momentary passion, warped prejudice, or the 
like “must be submitted to a distinct body,” a body not under those 
same influences.118  This check would lead to at least three important 
benefits: (1) laws that are sufficiently considered and deliberated, (2) 
a more stable body of law because well-considered laws are less 
likely to face repeal, and (3) more precise laws, the opposite of which 
 
112 See Virginia M. McInerney, Federalism and the Seventeenth Amendment, 7 J. 
CHRISTIAN JURIS. 153, 180 (1988) (“[T]he use of representation provided the means by 
which the House and the Senate would check each other.” (emphasis added)). 
113 See GEORGE MASON, OBJECTIONS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF GOVERNMENT FORMED BY 
THE CONVENTION (1787), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 85, at 
11 (criticizing the Senate’s participation in government expenditures despite the fact that 
Senators do not represent the people); Centinel I, INDEP. GAZETTEER (Phil.), Oct. 5, 1787, 
reprinted in 1 DEBATE, supra note 58, at 61; Cincinattus, Essay IV, N.Y. JOURNAL, Nov. 22, 
1787, reprinted in 6 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 18 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981); 
Republicus, Essay, KY. GAZETTE (Lexington), Mar. 1, 1788, reprinted in 5 THE COMPLETE 
ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 68, at 166–67 (arguing that any particular senator will 
represent only a small part of that state’s electorate). 
114 See Centinel II, FREEMAN’S JOURNAL (Phil.), Oct. 24, 1787, reprinted in 1 DEBATE, 
supra note 58, at 86 (“[F]rom their constitution, [Senators] may become so independent of 
the people as to be indifferent to its interests . . . .” (emphasis in original)). 
115 See A CITIZEN OF AMERICA, supra note 58, at 130 (noting the presence of 
bicameralism’s opponents in Pennsylvania). 
116 See Wilson’s Response, in 1 DEBATE, supra note 88, at 823–24. 
117 Id. at 824. 
118 Id. 
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can work destruction of the people’s liberties.119  But Wilson’s most 
ingenious point, in my view, is his argument from deterrence.  
Because each chamber will anticipate the embarrassment from the 
other chamber’s rejection of bad bills, “they will act with more 
caution” in the first place.120  Distinct bicameralism doesn’t just mean 
fewer bad laws; it means fewer bad bills.  That is a powerful check.  
And it saves money to boot: not only will both houses use time more 
efficiently, by focusing on better laws,121 but also the people’s 
monitoring costs are reduced by placing the immediate burden on the 
other chamber.122 
In the press, the Federalist Papers were particularly successful 
in arguing that the degree of distinctness was appropriate.  On one 
occasion, Madison argued that the critics’ assessment, i.e., that the 
benefits of direct accountability to the people outweighed the benefits 
of such distinct branches, misjudged the value of direct accountability 
and so resulted in the wrong conclusion.  In fact, he argued, to reduce 
accountability, and implement distinct branches, would be a better 
protection of the people’s liberties.  Madison tipped the scales by 
reminding readers of two ingenious points.  First, republics inherently 
suffer from the agency problem123: “It is a misfortune incident to 
republican government . . . that those who administer it may forget 
their obligations to their constituents . . . .”124  In its strongest form, 
this first point suggests that the very concept of a democratic republic 
is an oxymoron—that people must either represent themselves in 
government or expect representatives who pursue their own desires.  
In a more modest form, this point suggests that there is some limit on 
the ability of a representative body to represent accurately the views 
of its constituents.125  Attempting to push beyond that limit is fruitless 
 
119 See id. 
120 Id. 
121 Wilson’s Response, in 1 DEBATE, supra note 88, at 824. 
122 See id. at 823 (stating that the check of bicameralism “operates constantly”).  As we 
will see, the Framers envisioned the states fulfilling a similar monitoring role.  See infra 
notes 189–201 and accompanying text. 
123 See generally Clifford W. Smith, Jr., Agency Costs, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE 
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 39–40 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987). 
124 THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, supra note 90, at 378. 
125 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 2, at 322 (“A dependence on the people is, no 
doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the 
necessity of auxiliary precautions.”); see also Wilson’s Response, in 1 DEBATE, supra note 
88 (agreeing that constituents restrain their representatives but arguing that bicameralism 
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and wasteful, but even just nearing the limit incurs increasingly 
greater costs.  On this point alone, Madison reduced the value of 
direct accountability such that some might deem the scales tipped.  
But he proceeded to make his second point: The Senate is “a second 
branch of the legislative assembly . . . dividing the power with a 
first.”126  In other words, one cannot weigh the direct accountability 
of the Senate alone.  In isolation, the Senate need not be feared 
because it possesses only half the legislative power; Congress, on the 
other hand, ought to be feared.  But Congress, it turns out, is directly 
accountable to the people—in the House of Representatives.  Thus, 
direct accountability is satisfied, and to popularize the Senate will do 
nothing to increase that accountability.  So rendered, the benefits of a 
directly accountable Senate are trivial, heavily outweighed by the 
benefits of distinct branches.  Madison concluded the argument with 
force: “It doubles the security to the people by requiring the 
concurrence of two distinct bodies . . . .  [I]t must be politic to 
distinguish them from each other by every circumstance which will 
consist with a due harmony in all proper measures, and with the 
genuine principles of republican government.”127 
 
would be the “most useful restraint”). 
126 THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, supra note 90, at 378. 
127 Id. at 378–79; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 2, at 322 (“The remedy for 
[legislatures’ predominance in republican governments] is to divide the legislature into 
different branches; and to render them, by different modes of election . . . , as little connected 
with each other as the nature of their common functions and their common dependence on 
the society will admit.”); cf. A CITIZEN OF AMERICA, supra note 58, at 137 (“The proposed 
senate in America is constituted on principles more favorable to liberty [than those of 
Rome’s senate]: The members are elective, and by the separate legislatures . . . .”); THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 60, at 367–68 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing that the people could trust the 
federal government to regulate its own elections because of the different election modes for 
the House, Senate, and President).  At the Virginia Convention, Madison made a particular 
argument that indicates his strong feelings about distinct branches.  Patrick Henry argued 
throughout the Convention that the national government would be poised to overthrow the 
state governments.  See, e.g., Patrick Henry, Speech in Response to Governor Edmond 
Randolph (June 7, 1788), in 2 DEBATE, supra note 81, at 635 (arguing that the federal 
government could tax the people such that no revenues remained for the states).  Madison’s 
first retort was the right one: the Senate would rely on state legislatures for their appointment 
and so would defend the states’ existence.  See James Madison, Speech Regarding Direct 
Taxation by the Federal Government (June 11, 1788), in 2 DEBATE, supra note 81, at 658–
59.  But his second response exhibited a different logic: “[A coalition of the President, 
Senate, and House] could be supposed only from a similarity of the component parts.  A 
coalition is not likely to take place, because its component parts are heterogeneous in their 
nature.”  Id. at 659.  In other words, setting aside the fact that the states comprised an entire 
branch of Congress (which would seem to settle the matter), the houses (and the President) 
were so distinct that they would never successfully agree on measures intended to eviscerate 
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Hence, the founding generation deliberately determined that 
Congress would be divided into two distinct houses, distinguishable 
even in their mode of election.  In doing so, they laid down a wise 
structure that contributed to the protection of liberty for more than a 
century. 
3. A Modern Assessment 
The Founders’ provision for two distinct Congressional 
houses proved to be wise.  As Todd Zywicki describes, the senatorial 
mode of election created a frustrating obstacle for the special interest 
groups, which achieved much easier success in the House.128  
Because of the House’s direct connection with the people, an interest 
group could provide Representatives with campaign support that 
translated directly into votes—an incentive Representatives 
responded to.129  But Senators were responsible to a large number of 
distinct state legislatures, each of which housed representatives 
accountable to their own constituents: the translation of campaign 
support into votes was far less direct.130  Accordingly, interest groups 
had a much harder time rallying Senate support on their issues of 
choice,131 and a multitude of House special interest legislation failed 
in the Senate.132  This was bad news for special interest groups, but 
great news for liberty.  Indeed, Madison had argued that the Framers 
had hoped to design a government that obstructed these groups, 
 
the states.  Thus, a distinctly divided Congress was unable to encroach on the rights of the 
people or the states. 
128 See Todd J. Zywicki, Senators and Special Interests: A Public Choice Analysis of the 
Seventeenth Amendment, 73 OR. L. REV. 1007, 1039–40 (1994); see also POLE, supra note 
39, at 170 (“It was structure as much as party or class interest that tended to produce 
conservative results in terms of policy.”). 
129 See Zywicki, supra note 128, at 1039–40 (“Special-interest legislation frequently 
passed the House . . . .”). 
130 See HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 103 (“[T]he possibility of controlling the Senate through 
state campaign donations was somewhat remote.  It would have entailed paying the election 
expenses of a majority of the legislators in a majority of states.”); Zywicki, supra note 128, 
at 1039–40 (referring to the costs of funneling lobbying through state legislatures). 
131 See Todd J. Zywicki, Beyond the Shell and Husk of History: The History of the 
Seventeenth Amendment and Its Implications for Current Reform Proposals, 45 CLEV. ST. L. 
REV. 165, 178 (1997) (“[The] costs [of putting together two distinct winning coalitions] will 
increase further if the two houses are drawn from different constituencies.”). 
132 See HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 116; Zywicki, supra note 128, at 1039–40. 
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which he called “factions.”133 
That Senate lobbying was particularly expensive yielded two 
additional benefits.  First, because Senate lobbying required a certain 
level of expenditure to be successful, no law that yielded benefits less 
than that cost was worth an interest group’s time—on a host of 
measures, they just stopped trying.134  Such a benefit is an indirect 
manifestation of Wilson’s prediction that bicameralism would result 
in fewer bad bills.135  Another manifestation, perhaps the more 
powerful one yet, is the second benefit: if a bill was not worth the 
cost of lobbying the Senate, then the interest group had no reason to 
lobby the House either.136 
The historical evidence is likely unsurprising to most readers 
because the benefits of bicameralism are so intuitive.137  Dividing the 
 
133 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 78, 80 (James Madison) (defining a “faction” as a 
group of citizens whose interest is adverse to that of the community and arguing that a 
government must control factions’ effects). 
134 See Zywicki, supra note 128, at 1040 (“[T]he Senate's reluctance to follow the House's 
lead in passing redistributive legislation drove down the marginal return of lobbying either 
house.”). 
135 See supra text accompanying note 120. 
136 See Zywicki, supra note 128, at 1040.  Needless to say, Representatives were just as 
unhappy as the interest groups.  See id. at 1041 (noting that, between 1893 and 1911, the 
House initiated six proposals to reform the senatorial mode of election). 
137 Sanford Levinson is one of a growing number of scholars who argue that party politics 
dominates our legislative process to such a degree that unicameralism would provide a better 
structure for our legislature.  See SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICA’S FIFTY-ONE 
CONSTITUTIONS AND THE CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE 140–41 (2012).  The general 
counterargument regarding parties will be addressed shortly, see infra note 154 and 
accompanying text, but Levinson’s specific argument deserves a brief response now.  He 
bases his contention on two prongs: (1) unicameralism is not significantly less effective than 
bicameralism, and (2) bicameralism has become increasingly more costly.  See LEVINSON, 
supra at 140–41.  But neither prong is accurate.  Setting aside the deluge of evidence in favor 
of bicameralism, see infra notes 128–136, 141–143 and accompanying text, Levinson’s 
argument for unicameralism is unfounded.  He asserts that there is no evidence that 
Nebraska or New Zealand, the two most prominent entities with unicameral legislatures, 
suffer from their legislative structure.  See LEVINSON, supra, at 140.  But in so stating, 
Levinson commits the logical fallacy of appealing to ignorance (besides the fact that the 
contention seems doubtful, see, e.g., A CITIZEN OF AMERICA, supra note 58, at 133–34 
(criticizing specific results from Pennsylvania’s unicameral legislature)).  His statement of 
bicameralism’s increasing costliness is also flawed. Levinson states, “serious costs [are] 
imposed by institutional vetoes that make difficult the passage of what a majority might well 
view as ‘necessary’ legislation.”  LEVINSON, supra, at 141.  His word choice, though, 
employs some sleight of hand.  No proponent of bicameralism, past or present, has ever 
suggested bicameralism is beneficial because it impedes “necessary” legislation.  The 
argument all along has been that bicameralism impedes (some) “urgent” legislation, thus 
allowing time to filter out the “urgent” legislation that turns out not to be “necessary” after 
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legislature into chambers, at the least, adds costs to passing 
legislation, which will cause factions to think twice about any 
particular measure.138  And, as Noah Webster argued, the division 
alone will compartmentalize discussion in order to isolate undue 
influence in one house or the other.139 
And intuition accords with the Founders’ further decision to 
make the houses distinctive.  Then-Professor Joseph Story 
commented, “[i]f each branch is substantially framed upon the same 
plan, the advantages of the division are shadowy and imaginative.”140  
Modern-day scholarship justifies Story’s, and the founding 
generation’s, intuition.  Buchanan and Tullock demonstrate that the 
ability of factions to form majority coalitions (through vote-trading 
among representatives141) is increasingly difficult because of the 
composition of the House and Senate.142  Tsebelis and Money show 
both theoretically and empirically that bicameral legislatures are far 
superior in preserving the status quo,143 which the Founders designed 
to be liberty. 
It goes without saying then that the Seventeenth 
Amendment’s alteration of senatorial election mode did great damage 
to Congress’s internal checks.  The precise level of damage would 
have been hard to predict because election mode is just one of several 
 
all. 
138 See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 235 
(1962) (“It is evident that the two-house system will involve considerably higher decision-
making costs than the single-house system . . . .”); Zywicki, supra note 131, at 170. 
139 See A CITIZEN OF AMERICA, supra note 58, at 131–32. 
140 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 519 
(Melville M. Bigelow ed., 5th ed. 1995); see also id. (“[A] single branch is quite as good as 
two, if their composition is the same and their spirits and impulses the same.”).  In fact, 
Story makes a compelling argument that dividing the legislature into indistinct branches is 
worse than leaving the legislature undivided in the first place.  See id. at 520.  His argument 
weighs the costs and benefits: (1) indistinct bicameralism yields no benefits to the cause of 
liberty because both houses are so similar that special interest legislation that passes either 
house, passes both, but (2) indistinct bicameralism does add costs to passing legislation, 
which only serves to obstruct the majority from repealing that same special interest 
legislation.  See id.; cf. BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 138, at 236 (“[U]nless the bases 
for representation are significantly different in the two houses, there would seem to be little 
excuse for the two-house system.”). 
141 See BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 138, at 236. 
142 See id. at 247–48.  They also cite the potential of a Presidential veto, another 
institutional choice of the Framers, as a means of further improving the legislature’s ability 
to reflect the public will.  See id. at 248. 
143 GEORGE TSEBELIS & JEANETTE MONEY, BICAMERALISM 216 (1997). 
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differentiating characteristics.144  But as it turns out, state legislative 
election was the most important by far: “[D]irect election rendered 
the Senate less sedate and more closely tied to the people, 
synchronizing it with the House and the presidency; in fact, it often 
looks much like a smaller version of the House.”145  The great victory 
of the Progressive Movement146 single-handedly obliterated an 
important protection of liberty.147 
In my view, the strongest counterargument to a call for the 
Seventeenth Amendment’s repeal is the predominance of political 
parties in our legislative system, i.e., that repeal would make no 
difference.  In an extraordinarily insightful piece, Professors Daryl 
Levinson and Richard Pildes argue that the importance of separating 
parties has far surpassed that of separating powers.148  Although I do 
not find their argument persuasive that separation of powers is now 
irrelevant,149 I am persuaded that the influence of parties on 
government decisions is significant and growing.150  But even if the 
strongest form of their argument were accurate, it would not obviate 
the need for repealing the Seventeenth Amendment.  Most 
importantly, their thorough research targets the interrelationship 
between the executive and legislative branches,151 a relationship 
 
144 See supra note 38. 
145 Sara Brandes Cook & John R. Hibbing, A Not-So Distant Mirror: The 17th Amendment 
and Congressional Change, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 845, 852–53 (1997); see also McInerney, 
supra note 112, at 177 (“Senators simply do not represent the states.”); Zywicki, supra note 
131, at 217 (“Senators now represent a variety of national interest groups—a role identical to 
that of House members.”); Zywicki, supra note 28, at 88 (“[S]enators today act all but 
identically to House members . . . .”). 
146 Zywicki, supra note 128, at 1011 (“[M]any aspects of the Progressive Era, and its later 
cousins, the New Deal and Great Society, may not have been possible without the 
institutional reform of the direct election of senators.”). 
147 See Zywicki, supra note 145, at 89 (“[T]he Seventeenth Amendment substantially 
watered down bicameralism as a check on interest-group rent-seeking, laying the foundation 
for the modern special-interest state.”).  But see Sean M. Theriault & David W. Rohde, The 
Gingrich Senators and Party Polarization in the U.S. Senate, 73 J. POL. 1011, 1011 (2011) 
(“By virtue of its design and practice over the last 220 years, the Senate has been less likely 
to be captured by the trends of the day than the House.”). 
148 See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2315–16 (2006). 
149 See id. at 2385. 
150 See Richard A. Epstein, Why Parties and Powers Both Matter: A Separationist 
Response to Levinson and Pildes, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 210, 210 (2006) (“It is futile to argue 
that political parties do not influence relations between the legislative and executive 
branches.”). 
151 See Levinson & Pildes, supra note 148, at 2315. 
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entirely distinct from that between two chambers of the legislature.152  
Indeed, the chambers’ relationship appears to be less defined by party 
differences than those of the executive and legislative branches.153  
Second, the Seventeenth Amendment increased the power of parties 
in electing Senators,154 so repeal ought to reverse that trend in some 
measure.  Finally, contrary to the authors’ contention,155 separation of 
powers can work in tandem with other measures to continue to check 
government activity.156 
B. State Representatives 
In his famous Federalist Paper Number 39, Madison engaged 
some critics of the Constitution who purposely scrutinized the 
document under a double standard.  These critics, Madison reports, 
require that the federal government both represent the American 
people as a national republic and preserve the dignity of the states as 
a confederacy.157  Yet perhaps because plenty of Americans agreed 
with one or the other standard, Madison set out to demonstrate that 
the new government would meet both standards—that it was both 
“national” and “federal.”158  He then proceeded to describe point after 
point in the proposed plan that met one standard or the other or, at 
times, both.159  One such point was the curious character of Congress: 
the House would derive directly from the people and so was clearly 
national, but “[t]he Senate, on the other hand, [would] derive its 
powers from the States as political and coequal societies” and so was, 
 
152 See TSEBELIS & MONEY, supra note 143, at 1 (“The existence of a second chamber 
appears to have little effect on the relationship between the legislature and the executive.”). 
153 See Theriault & Rohde, supra note 147, at 1011. 
154 See Bybee, supra note 50, at 551; McInerney, supra note 112, at 171. 
155 See Levinson & Pildes, supra note 148, at 2325–26 (summarizing some of Woodrow 
Wilson’s critiques of our federal governmental structure). 
156 See Epstein, supra note 150, at 212–14 (describing the executive and legislative 
branches’ continued need to negotiate and debate the degree to which a particular measure 
will go, even if the same party controls and supports the measure generally); see also id. at 
216 (“No one can dismiss checks and balances as a nonstarter just because we live in an age 
of greater party discipline.”). 
157 See THE FEDERALIST PAPERS NO. 39, at 242–43. 
158 See id. at 246 (concluding the paper by describing the Constitution as both “national” 
and “federal”). 
159 See, e.g., id. at 243–44 (arguing that the ratification process would be federal because 
the people would ratify the Constitution within their respective states). 
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according to Madison, clearly federal.160 
Madison’s description of the Senate implicates another reason 
the Founders thought it beneficial to elect Senators through state 
legislatures—the Senate would thereby represent the states.  Among 
other benefits, the Founders believed that a Senate with states for its 
constituents would constitute a tremendous foil for the people’s 
representation in the House.  This was because the states brought two 
advantages to their role as constituents: (1) they have an incredible 
ability to gather, process, and act on information about the national 
government, and (2) their motive for checking federal overreach is 
self-executing.161  Before delving into the historical debates on this 
front, and assessing the result, this Section addresses the 
Convention’s compromise on state representation. 
1. The Compromise 
It would be inaccurate to state that a majority of the 
Constitution’s proponents wanted the states to be represented in the 
Senate.162  Note the careful wording above that the Founders “thought 
it beneficial.”  The founding generation recognized advantages to 
state representation in the Senate, but many were not happy about 
it—indeed, it was the result of compromise.163 
 
160 Id. at 244. 
161 To be clear, my intent is not to debate the intended role of the Senate in the scheme of 
federalism.  In fact, my intended argument assumes the Senate was to be an instrument of 
federalism and then extrapolates from that assumption: if the Senate would naturally defend 
states’ prerogatives, this would result in a more divided Congress that was less likely to 
trample on citizens’ rights generally.  As to the federalism debate, I recommend to the reader 
a large body of research from numerous, far more capable scholars.  See generally ROSSUM, 
supra note 8; Vikram David Amar, Indirect Effects of Direct Election: A Structural 
Examination of the Seventeenth Amendment, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1347 (1996) [hereinafter 
Amar, Indirect Effects]; Vik D. Amar, The Senate and the Constitution, 97 YALE L.J. 1111 
(1988); Bybee, supra note 50; Laura E. Little, An Excursion into the Uncharted Waters of 
the Seventeenth Amendment, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 629 (1991); McInerney, supra note 112; 
William H. Riker, The Senate and American Federalism, 49 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 452 (1955); 
Zywicki, supra note 131; Zywicki, supra note 128; Roger G. Brooks, Comment, Garcia, The 
Seventeenth Amendment, and the Role of the Supreme Court in Defending Federalism, 10 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 189 (1987). 
162 And yet I would consider it quite accurate to say so for the other subsections of this 
Note.  A majority of proponents did want a bicameral Congress with distinct houses, see 
supra Section II.A, as well as an independent Senate comprised of distinguished Senators, 
see infra Section II.C. 
163 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, supra note 90, at 377–78 (finding no theory to 
justify equal representation fully but acknowledging that its inclusion was a compromise to 
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The Virginia Plan that Edmund Randolph proposed to the 
Convention resolved that both branches of Congress would have 
proportional representation.164  That resolution was an object of 
contention the next day165 (when the Committee of the Whole166 
began reviewing the Plan) and continued to be for many weeks 
thereafter.167 
The tension over state representation was in full swing at the 
time the Framers debated the Senate’s mode of election.  The very 
first comment on Dickinson’s proposal168 was that of Roger Sherman 
as he seconded it.169  Sherman argued that allowing the states to 
participate in the federal government would thereby increase their 
support of it and facilitate harmony between the two.170  Sherman and 
others favored preserving some part of the Articles of Confederation, 
 
save the Union).  To be clear, election by state legislatures was not the compromise—state 
representation was.  See id. (referring to the states as parties to the constitution that were 
granted an equal share of representation therein).  The two are certainly intertwined, but 
opponents of state representation had little argument with state legislative election; their 
overriding concern was proportional versus equal representation, and any disfavor toward 
state legislative election was because of its incompatibility with proportional representation 
(and a small Senate).  See supra note 105.  Two thoughts.  First, the compromise does not 
taint the arguments of Sections II.A or II.C.  Those benefits would have attached to state 
legislative election with or without the equal representation compromise, and many 
proponents would have argued for state legislative election.  Thus, when Publius and others 
outlined these virtues, they were not simply making the best of it but arguing with 
conviction.  Second, the compromise does taint any argument that Senators ought to 
represent the states on principle.  Instead, my view, as reflected in this section’s thesis, is that 
because the Senate would represent the states, see U.S. CONST. art. V (“[N]o State, without 
its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.”), the Founders set out to 
discover the benefits of that compromise—and they were successful (though not convinced 
that equal representation was superior).  Assuming that same baseline, the benefits discussed 
in this section also remain untainted by the compromise from which they stem. 
164 Notes of James Madison (May 29, 1787), supra note 78, at 20. 
165 See Notes of James Madison (May 30, 1787), supra note 81, at 36–38. 
166 See supra note 80. 
167 See, e.g., Notes of James Madison (June 15, 1787), supra note 71, at 242 n.*. 
168 See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
169 See Notes of James Madison (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 150. 
170 Id.  The primary purpose of Sherman’s comment was, no doubt, to indicate that state 
representation was a requirement if the large states wished the small states to assent to the 
formation of this new government.  See Notes of James Madison (June 15, 1787), supra note 
71, at 242 n.* (indicating that delegates from the small states, including Connecticut—
Sherman’s home state, drafted the New Jersey Plan in response to their disapproval of the 
Virginia Plan).  Hence, his discussion of “support” refers less to the importance of federal 
and state governments’ continued support of each other and more to the initial support of the 
states, without which the national government would never be able to form. 
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in which only the states were represented.171  On the other hand, some 
delegates blamed the states (and a weak Confederation) for the 
country’s obvious troubles.172 
The ultimate decision on the issue was Benjamin Franklin’s 
Great Compromise:173 the states would have equal voting in the 
Senate,174 and the House, proportionally represented, would have sole 
power to originate money bills.175 
The ratifiers’ debate regarding Senators as state 
representatives was a peculiar one because the Anti-Federalists, the 
largest group of the Constitution’s opponents by far,176 were pro-
state.177  For that reason, when they spoke about state representation 
in the Senate, it was not to criticize the mode of election178 but to 
propose ways to increase the states’ power over the Senate.179 
 
171 See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. V, para. 1 (providing for state 
legislatures to direct the election of the states’ representatives to the unicameral Continental 
Congress). 
172 See, e.g., STEWART, supra note 77, at 19 (“For Washington and Madison, the problem 
with the Articles was the states.”). 
173 See Notes of James Madison (July 5, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 38, 
at 526 n.*. 
174 See Journal (July 7, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 38, at 548–49. 
175 See Journal (July 6, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 38, at 538–39.  
Ultimately, the concession amounted to nothing.  See, e.g., HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 116 
(describing the Senate’s amendment of House-initiated bills to circumvent the restriction).  
But it would be inaccurate to say the Federalists got the short end of the stick: most 
importantly, they averted disaster and secured a far more nationalistic government than the 
Articles of Confederation provided for, but more specifically, the states control over 
Senators turned out to be more troublesome than anticipated.  See infra notes 344–345 and 
accompanying text. 
176 See STORING, supra note 27, at 3 (implying that the Anti-Federalists were “those who 
opposed the Constitution”). 
177 See id. at 15 (characterizing the Anti-Federalists’ position as one that emphasized the 
“primacy of the states”); see also, e.g., Federal Farmer XI, supra note 85, at 287 (“In this . . . 
[combination of the federal and state governments,] the state governments [are] an essential 
part, which ought always to be kept distinctly in view, and preserved . . . .”). 
178 See, e.g., Federal Farmer XI, supra note 85, at 288 (stating that one of the “several 
advantages” of the Senate was that by “the mode of its appointment, [it] will probably be 
influenced to support the state governments”). 
179 Perhaps the most common suggestion was the ability to recall Senators.  See, e.g., 
Brutus XVI, supra note 85, at 445; Cornelius, Essay, HAMPSHIRE CHRONICLE (n.p.), Dec. 11, 
1787, reprinted in 4 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 140 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981); 
Federal Farmer XI, supra note 85, at 289; Melancton Smith & Alexander Hamilton, Debate 
Regarding Rotation in the Senate at the New York Ratifying Convention (June 25, 1788), in 
2 DEBATE, supra note 81, at 805, which the Articles of Confederation had included, 
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. V, para. 1.  And perhaps a close second is to 
reduce term length and/or require Senators to rotate out of the position for a few years and 
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Madison, Hamilton, and others seized on this alignment of 
interests.  Although they opposed equal representation on principle, 
they accepted the need for the compromise and consistently reminded 
the Anti-Federalists that the Senate’s mode of election would protect 
the states from desuetude.180 
For the purposes of this Note, the correctness of the Founders’ 
compromise is irrelevant.181  Regardless of whether states as states 
deserve a seat in government, the fact is that our Constitution 
incorporates that principle in the deepest way.182  With that as a 
 
some number of successive terms.  See, e.g., Brutus XVI, supra note 85, at 444–45 (4-year 
terms and 3-year rotation after 1 term); Federal Farmer XI, supra note 85, at 288, 290–92 (3- 
or 4-year terms and 2-year rotation after 1 term); Gilbert Livingston, Speech Regarding the 
Senate’s Power at the New York Ratifying Convention (June 24, 1788), in 2 DEBATE, supra 
note 81, at 791 (6-year rotation after 1 term).  Publius explicitly defended the proposed term 
length of six years, see THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, supra note 89, at 388–89.  He also rebutted 
calls for rotating the President’s position with several counterarguments, some of which 
apply to the case of Senators, see THE FEDERALIST NO. 72, at 437–40 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(arguing that categorically forbidding reelection reduces incentives for good behavior, 
deprives the people of the President’s accumulated experience, etc.). 
180 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 9, at 76 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The proposed Constitution, 
so far from implying an abolition of the State governments, makes them constituent parts of 
the national sovereignty, by allowing them a direct representation in the Senate . . . .”); THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 62, supra note 90, at 377 (arguing that state legislature election of Senators 
“giv[es] to the State governments such an agency in the formation of the federal government 
as must secure the authority of the former”). 
181 Plenty of proponents and opponents of the Constitution criticized the theoretical 
underpinnings of equal representation.  See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, supra note 90, at 
377–78 (proponent); Patrick Henry & James Madison, Debate Regarding Henry’s Main 
Objections to the Constitution at the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 12, 1788), in 2 
DEBATE, supra note 81, at 683-84.  And that practice continues today.  See, e.g., Reynolds v. 
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 574, 576 (1964); Misha Tseytlin, The United States Senate and the 
Problem of Equal State Suffrage, 94 GEO. L.J. 859, 863–67 (2006) (critiquing the principle 
but also citing several other sources that do the same).  For myself, I embarked on this 
project largely convinced that the sovereign states deserved representation in Congress.  See, 
e.g., Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 574 (“[I]n establishing our type of federalism a group of formerly 
independent States bound themselves together under one national government.  Admittedly, 
the original 13 States surrendered some of their sovereignty in agreeing to join together ‘to 
form a more perfect Union.’ ”).  However, during the course of my research, the arguments 
of some fellow federalists have persuaded me that federalism’s justification lies not in its 
protection of states’ rights but the peoples’.  See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 
144, 181 (1992) (O’Connor, J.) (“The Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of States 
for the benefit of the States or state governments as abstract political entities . . . .  To the 
contrary, the Constitution divides authority between federal and state governments for the 
protection of individuals.”). 
182 Assuming state consent to be an impossibility (as the Framers did), only a new 
Constitutional Convention could ever change the Senate’s representative composition.  See 
U.S. CONST. art. V (“[N]o State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage 
in the Senate.”) 
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baseline, election of Senators by state legislatures is a necessary 
(though probably not sufficient) component of state representation.183  
And as it turns out, having states for constituents does wonders for 
the Senate as a Congressional check. 
2. “A Convenient Link” 
Most supporters of senatorial election by state legislatures 
argued that the states deserved representation in Congress, but they 
also raised other arguments for why state representation would be 
beneficial.  Dickinson argued that “the sense of the States would be 
better collected through their Governments.”184  Although the 
delegates did not much debate this assertion, it’s an important one: 
Purportedly, the state governments can do a better job of 
communicating the people’s needs185 to the federal government than 
can the people themselves. 
One manifestation of this claim is efficiency.  There was no 
conceivable way that a Senator could canvass the state in search of 
citizens’ opinions.  The distance would be too large.  Those concerns 
have largely diminished in our day with improvements of technology, 
but distance wasn’t the only concern.  Gathering opinions costs time 
and money.  Senator’s would need to devote considerable time to the 
job they were elected to do—govern—but that left less time for 
 
183 Riker, supra note 161, at 455 (“Election by state legislatures implied accountability to 
them.”). 
184 Notes of James Madison (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 150. 
185 Couched within Dickinson’s statement is another layer of meaning.  He was also trying 
to preserve the voice of states as states, thus explaining his reference to the “sense of the 
States,” not the “sense of the people of the States.”  Id.  There is little doubt that he chose 
those words carefully.  See Notes of James Madison (June 15, 1787), supra note 71, at 242 
n.* (stating that the small states refused to yield on equal representation and thus subject 
themselves to the large states); John Dickinson, Letters of Fabius, in PAMPHLETS OF THE 
CONSTITUTION (P.L. Ford ed., 1788), reprinted in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787 appx. A, CCI, at 304 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937) [hereinafter 3 
FARRAND’S] (reporting that the delegates had agreed “that for the securer preservation of 
these [state] sovereignties, they ought to be represented in a body by themselves, and with 
equal suffrage”).  Indeed, the notes of other delegates use different wording that clarifies 
Madison’s recording.  See Notes of Rufus King (June 7, 1787), supra note 100, at 158 
(“[T]he mind & body of the State as such shd. be represented in the national Legislature.” 
(emphasis added)); Notes of Alexander Hamilton (June 7, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, 
supra note 38, at 160 (“[Dickinson] would have the state legislatures elect senators, because 
he would bring into the general government the sense of the state Governments . . . .” 
(emphasis added)). 
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speaking with constituents.  And even if, somehow, a Senator could 
gather the entire constituency together to discuss an issue, the project 
would still be inefficient because of the number of opinions to 
process.  Here was a chance for state legislatures to help.  State 
legislators represent far smaller districts, and although their time 
includes governing also, they can hear from a greater proportion of 
their jurisdiction with less time (by definition).  Furthermore, state 
legislators need to consolidate those opinions for their own work.  
That consolidation provides valuable information that a Senator can 
use. 
A second manifestation of the claim is refinement.  As will be 
addressed later in regard to Senators themselves, the Framers 
believed it was a representative’s duty to filter through the desires of 
constituents and weed out those that were shortsighted and made in 
the heat of the moment.186  State legislators could perform that 
function at the state level as they gathered constituents’ opinions.  
Indeed, the Senator might then engage in a further refinement once 
the state legislature communicated its findings.187 
The ratifiers also did not much debate Dickinson’s point.  
They did, however, pick up on his general proposition that a 
centralized state legislature is far better at gathering, processing, and 
communicating information than a diffuse body of people.  Madison 
eloquently referenced this point in writing that the Senate’s mode of 
election would “form a convenient link between the two systems.”188 
Hamilton discussed the advantage of the states in more detail, 
but he focused on the flow of information in the opposite direction.  
The states would keep Senators on their toes and fighting for liberty 
because the states could detect danger and communicate it to the 
 
186 See infra Section II.C.2. 
187 The ability of state legislatures themselves to be temperate was the subject of some 
debate.  Dickinson managed to begin the argument about as weakly as possible; he conceded 
that the states had engaged in some poor, short-sighted decisions but then argued that only 
state representation would prevent the federal government from doing the same.  See Notes 
of James Madison (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 153.  Madison recognized his advantage 
and argued that, as the state legislatures had indeed indulged a great many of the people’s 
short-sighted requests, they were likely to promote the same conduct in the national 
government.  See id. at 154.  Thankfully, Elbridge Gerry saved Dickinson’s point by 
rejecting the latter’s factual concession: the legislatures had often been against the people’s 
shortsighted measures, particularly when they were bicameral and had a more refined second 
branch.  See id. at 154–55. 
188 THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, supra note 90, at 377. 
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people quickly.189  In the penultimate Federalist Paper,190 Hamilton 
explained the importance of the Senate’s mode of election to the 
states’ information-gathering. 
According to him, some Americans objected to granting the 
federal government “such large powers” when most people would 
live too far from the Capitol to monitor its operation.191  Among other 
clever responses,192 Hamilton countered that state governments, in 
their role as monitors, would eliminate any alleged effects of 
distance.193  He wrote that state officials would serve as “sentinels,” 
 
189 Although he did not touch on the importance of the Senate’s mode of election, 
Hamilton described this process forcefully in one of the earlier papers: 
It may safely be received as an axiom in our political system, that the 
State governments will, in all possible contingencies, afford complete 
security against invasions of the public liberty by the national authority.  
Projects of usurpation cannot be masked under pretenses so likely to 
escape the penetration of select bodies of men, as of the people at large.  
The legislatures will have better means of information.  They can 
discover the danger at a distance; and possessing all the organs of civil 
power and confidence of the people, they can at once adopt a regular 
plan of opposition, in which they can combine all the resources of the 
community.  They can readily communicate with each other in the 
different States, and unite their common forces for the protection of their 
common liberty. 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, at 181 (Alexander Hamilton); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 26, at 
172 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[T]he State legislatures . . . will constantly have their attention 
awake to the conduct of the national rulers, and will be ready enough, if anything improper 
appears, to sound the alarm to the people . . . .”); Smith & Hamilton, supra note 85, at 767 
(referring to the states as “bodies of perpetual observation”).  But Hamilton did not explain 
at that time what the legislatures’ “means of information” was. 
190 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 515–17 (Alexander Hamilton). 
191 Id. at 515–16.  Hamilton used quotation marks to introduce the objection but stated that 
it comes from “objectors,” so he was not likely quoting a particular publication or speaker.  
Among others, though, Brutus had pointed to the size of a country as an insurmountable 
obstacle in keeping citizens informed about their representatives’ actions and motives (and 
his criticisms were published in the New York Journal contemporaneously with the 
Federalist Papers’ publication).  See Brutus, Essay I, N.Y. Journal, Oct. 18, 1787, reprinted 
in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 85, at 371. 
192 His immediate response was that the critique proved too much: if distance really limits 
government accountability, as argued, then the people should not just withhold “large” 
powers—they should withhold all powers, yet most everyone agreed there ought to be some 
powers delegated to the Union.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, supra note 190, at 516.  His 
second riposte was that only those living in the immediate vicinity of government can 
monitor it directly, so those living away from state capitols face the same problem.  See id.  
But this large majority of citizens manages just fine: They read the laws and news; they 
correspond with their representatives; they communicate with the few citizens that 
personally observe the government’s operations.  See id. 
193 Id. 
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that they would be aware of all the national government’s conduct, 
and that they would quickly pass along their learning.194  This process 
benefits the people because they can continue to focus on their 
occupations and families, thus developing and growing America’s 
economy and culture.  And furthermore, state officials can condense, 
summarize, analyze, and explain the data they collect to improve and 
ease the people’s understanding.195 
But thus far, Hamilton failed to address a glaring flaw in his 
theory: assuming, as we must, that the state officials also live at some 
distance from the Capitol, he did not yet provide an explanation for 
the state officials’ information source.  Here, Hamilton shines.  “[I]t 
will be in [the state governments’] power to adopt and pursue a 
regular and effectual system of intelligence.”196  The “intelligence” 
and “power” to which Hamilton referred are more than publicly 
printed laws, newspapers, or communications from nearby residents 
(information sources he listed a few sentences earlier),197 which are 
available to the layman.198  Included among the earlier list also are 
“correspondences from . . . representatives.”  The states, it turns out, 
under the Constitution’s prescribed mode of election, have 
representatives too—Senators.199  Hamilton’s reference is to 
informants.  The state legislatures would be in continual 
communication with their Senators; they would require reports; they 
would read their representatives’ votes.  And Senators, to at least 
some degree,200 would be loyal to those legislatures,201 bringing back 
 
194 See id. 
195 Hamilton did not address the obvious risk that state officials will also editorialize the 
information for their own benefit.  The probable reason for this forbearance is his audience.  
Anti-Federalists sang the praises of their state governments, and their bias played right into 
Hamilton’s hand.  My instinct is that Hamilton viewed the checks of federalism as running in 
both directions.  See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 2, at 323 (“[T]he different 
governments will control each other,” such that the federal government would do its own 
part to correct misinformation). 
196 THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, supra note 190, at 516; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 52, at 
330 (James Madison) (stating that Congress will be “watched” by “several collateral 
legislatures”). 
197 THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, supra note 190, at 516. 
198 Although, as stated, state governments will also have the time, intelligence, and 
experience to process and analyze this data for their constituents’ benefit. 
199 Id. 
200 See infra Section II.C (explaining that the founding generation also intended for 
Senators to have a degree of independence). 
201 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, at 296 (James Madison) (arguing that federal government 
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necessary information for the states’ protection. 
3. A Rivalship of Power 
In defending his proposal, Dickinson stumbled upon a second 
argument for representing the states in Congress, one that altered the 
course of history: “The preservation of the States in a certain degree 
of agency is indispensible [sic].  [State legislative election of 
Senators] will produce that collision between the different authorities 
which should be wished for in order to check each other.”202  In a 
word, federalism.  Dickinson introduced also the two most important 
aspects of the theory.  First and foremost, he referred to the states in 
their agency role.  In its legitimate forms, federalism theory is geared 
toward the protection of the freedoms of the people, i.e., the 
principals.203  Thus, Dickinson wisely refrained from suggesting that 
states (and their leaders) deserved a role in order to protect their own 
interests.  Second, he described the concept of the vertical levels of 
government competing against one another such that each checked 
the other to secure the people’s liberties.  Dickinson’s proposal, 
though, went one step further than simply creating two government 
levels—it gave the lower (and in his mind, weaker) level a place in 
the upper level where the former could more directly check the 
infringements of the latter.204 
 
representatives will be biased toward the states); Samuel Huntington, Governor of 
Connecticut, Speech Regarding the Need for a Strong National Government at the 
Connecticut Ratifying Convention (Jan. 9, 1788), in 1 DEBATE, supra note 58, at 887 (stating 
that his experience with the Continental Congress was strong advocacy for the 
representative’s respective state, and that he expected the same for the Constitution’s 
Congress).  Indeed, Madison expected all Senators to have served in their state’s legislature 
and thought some might even serve in both roles concurrently, see THE FEDERALIST NO. 56, 
at 348 (James Madison), something the Convention voted not to forbid, Notes of James 
Madison (June 26, 1787), supra note 92, at 429. 
202 Notes of James Madison (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 152–53 (statement of John 
Dickinson). 
203 See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) (O’Connor, J.) (“The 
Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of States for the benefit of the States or state 
governments as abstract political entities . . . .  To the contrary, the Constitution divides 
authority between federal and state governments for the protection of individuals.”). 
204 George Mason appears to have recognized this unique trait in Dickinson’s argument.  
Mason, who had the last (powerful, as usual) word before the Committee voted unanimously 
to recommend election of Senators by state legislatures, argued that there was no “better 
means” for defending the states against the federal government’s encroachments than 
“giving them some share in, or rather to make them a constituent part of, the Natl. 
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Dickinson had no need to explain the state motivations that 
would lead to his predicted “collision.”  Those who wished to debate 
him on this point were more interested in whether the states really 
needed protecting,205 or whether the states were actually a trustworthy 
check.206  No one told Dickinson that the states would not be 
motivated to preserve their power against federal encroachment.207 
During the ratification debates, though, proponents were 
quick to note the states’ inherent motivations to defend themselves.  
Indeed, what the ratifiers noticed was that bicameralism could 
harness those motivations, thus, Congress would be less likely to pass 
oppressive legislation than with Senators who directly represented the 
people. 
Hamilton’s most obvious explication of the concept came 
during his earlier-mentioned description of the states’ intelligence 
network.208  His description of the network itself was already 
impressive, but Hamilton took the argument one step further and 
showed readers that, from the people’s viewpoint, the system is self-
executing.  Even if the people were to stop pressuring their state 
legislators for information, the system “may be relied upon, if it were 
only from rivalship of power.”209  In other words, state leaders like 
 
Establishment.”  Notes of James Madison (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 155–56 
(statement of George Mason); see also Notes of James Madison (June 25, 1787), supra note 
41, at 407 (statement of George Mason) (similar remarks in front of the Convention). 
205 See id.  See Notes of James Madison (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 153 (statement 
of James Wilson); see also Notes of James Madison (June 21, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S 
RECORDS, supra note 38, at 355–56 (statement of James Wilson) (making a similar argument 
when the Convention prepared to vote on the Committee’s recommendation).  Hamilton and 
Madison agreed wholeheartedly.  See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 25, at 163–64 (Alexander 
Hamilton); THE FEDERALIST NOS. 46–47, at 294-308; cf. Notes of James Madison (June 21, 
1787), supra note 38, at 357 (statement of James Madison) (arguing that, even if the national 
government tends to overpower the state governments, the phenomenon makes no difference 
as long as the people are free). 
206 After all, the state legislatures had instigated some of the states’ “great evils,” 
including paper money schemes.  See Notes of James Madison (June 7, 1787), supra note 
38, at 154 (statement of James Madison).  Madison’s distaste for the states, however, did not 
prevent him from becoming federalism’s most famous advocate.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 
51, supra note 2, at 323; THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, supra note 90, at 377 (contending that 
state legislatures’ election of Senators “giv[es] to the State governments such an agency in 
the formation of the federal government as must secure the authority of the former”). 
207 See Amar, Indirect Effects, supra note 161, at 1380 (“[T]he Framers counted on [the 
selfishness of State legislatures] in the way they devised institutions to protect liberty overall 
. . . .”). 
208 See supra notes 190–201 and accompanying text. 
209 THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, supra note 190, at 516–17; see also id. at 516 (arguing that 
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power too.  They will do all they can to maintain a piece of the pie, 
the bigger the better. 
Madison made a similar claim in an earlier paper.  Objectors 
to the Constitution argued that the House of Representatives would 
be far too small to be “trusted with so much power.”210  After 
demonstrating that the small number of Representatives would soon 
become a nonissue,211 Madison went on to suggest that America’s 
situation is such that a small number of Representatives will never be 
a risk anyway.212  He noted, among other things, “the spirit which 
actuates the State legislatures.”213  Elaborating just a few sentences 
later, he remarked, “I am unable to conceive that the State 
legislatures, which must feel so many motives to watch . . . the federal 
legislature, would fail either to detect or to defeat a conspiracy of the 
latter against the liberties of their common constituents.”214 
Hamilton and Madison’s proposed benefit is a powerful one.  
Like Wilson’s bicameralism, which would be “the most useful 
restraint upon the legislature, because it operates constantly,”215 the 
rivalship of power would motivate the states as constituents to 
continually press their Senators for votes that minimized federal 
power.  And that focus would reduce the opportunity for the federal 
government to trample on the rights of the people. 
 
operating the intelligence system will be in a state’s “disposition”); Smith & Hamilton, in 2 
DEBATE, supra note 85, at 767 (statement of Alexander Hamilton) (referring to the states as 
“perpetual observers”); cf. James Iredell et. al, Debate Regarding Congressional Control of 
Elections at the North Carolina Ratifying Convention (July 25, 1788), in 2 DEBATE, supra 
note 81, at 857 (arguing that Congress’s control of elections was not a concern because the 
state legislatures would “immediately resent” any abuse).  Recognizing the agency problem, 
Hamilton later pointed out that, when Senators go astray, the state legislatures can legislate 
directly on the national level—through the Amendment process.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 
85, supra note 46, at 525–26; see also Oliver Ellsworth, Speech Regarding the Dual 
Sovereignty and Taxing Powers of the Federal and State Governments at the Connecticut 
Ratifying Convention (Jan. 7, 1788), in 1 DEBATE, supra note 58, at 883–84 (“But perhaps at 
some time or other there will be a context, the states may rise against the general 
government.  If this does take place, if all the states combine, if all oppose, the whole will 
not eat up the [page break] members, but the measure which is opposed to the sense of the 
people, will prove abortive.”). 
210 THE FEDERALIST NO. 55, at 343 (James Madison). 
211 Id. 
212 Id. at 343–44. 
213 Id. at 344. 
214 Id. (emphasis added). 
215 Wilson’s Response, supra note 88, at 823. 
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4. A Modern Assessment 
Both benefits that the founding generation recognized came to 
pass.  As to the states maintaining an intelligence network, it is clear 
that state legislatures required reports from their Senators regarding 
voting records, among other things.216  Two factors, though, have 
certainly diminished the need for a state’s information-gathering 
abilities: technology and the press.  The average citizen today can 
access a great deal of information about the government, and 
although he or she lacks the time or experience to process that 
information, certain members of the press have developed such 
expertise in politics that they can interpret the information.  On the 
other hand, this proliferation of information has depersonalized the 
relationship entirely.  Hamilton envisioned Senators returning home 
and personally reporting to state legislatures on what they had seen, 
and then the two could plan a response together.  With today’s 
impersonal network of information, the people do not enjoy that 
privilege.  Indeed, it would seem Dickinson’s point has become the 
more important one in that the state legislatures could provide a 
single location for Senators to seek the consolidated opinions of the 
people.  But, the Seventeenth Amendment succeeded in effecting that 
depersonalization. 
It also succeeded in stripping the Senate’s constituency of 
self-motivated monitoring.  The mechanism was certainly working 
after the Constitution’s ratification.  Indeed, it worked so well that the 
states dragged the country into a civil war.  Even today, states 
continue to monitor the federal government,217 but they have lost 
 
216 See, e.g., 46 CONG. REC. 2244 (1911) (statement of Sen. Elihu Root) (opposing the 
Seventeenth Amendment because reporting his actions to laymen would be more difficult 
than the current state of affairs—reporting to the state legislatures).  Indeed, there is at least 
one documented example of a Senator in the first Congress being invited by a state 
legislature to appear and explain a particular vote.  See Riker, supra note 161, at 457.  But 
the relevance of that invitation is questionable because he refused to appear, and the state did 
not reelect him.  See id. 
217 Consider, for example, the challenge to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
by twenty-seven states.  See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).  
Nonetheless, in a world of public choice theory, Michael Greve and others have mounted a 
compelling campaign to demonstrate that the states welcome increased federal power 
because it reduces horizontal competition and preserves surplus to distribute among factions.  
See, e.g., MICHAEL S. GREVE, THE UPSIDE-DOWN CONSTITUTION 7–8 (2012); see also Ilya 
Somin, Why Repealing the Seventeenth Amendment Won’t Curb Federal Power, 12 ENGAGE 
88, 91 (2011), available at www.fed-soc.org/aboutus/DownloadLibrary?id=3670.  If one 
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their primary outlet for action (instructing Senators).  This has 
prompted a renewed interest in the Senate’s role in federalism,218 and 
many scholars recognize the potential self-motivation that states 
would bring to the table as constituents.219  For now, states must 
sound the alarm to the people and hope that the people will pressure 
their Senators into action.  In a perverted reversal of roles, it is no 
longer the state as intermediary between the Senator and the people, 
but the people as intermediaries between the Senator and the state.  
And as has become all too clear, the people rarely have the time, 
resources, and knowledge for effective collective action.220 
C. Distinguished and Independent 
The word “tyranny” possesses only half the meaning it once 
did.  Today, when one thinks of tyranny, one thinks of a tyrant.  A 
Hitler, Julius Caesar, or King George III.  A tyrant is a ruler who 
exerts dominion over others to diminish their freedom.  The founding 
generation knew such tyranny all too well.  They had lived under the 
taxes of King George III; their suffering under his rule had driven 
them to sign the Declaration of Independence and separate 
themselves from their Mother Country.221  It drove them to war. 
But “tyranny” can take another form.  “Tyranny” can also 
refer to a group.  And it need not be a small group, like an oligarchy.  
The group can be much larger.  In fact, the group could comprise the 
majority of the population.  And it is this half of the meaning that 
many have forgotten—the “tyranny” of the majority.222 
 
carries that theory to its ultimate conclusion, it would suggest that granting states 
representation in Congress was actually dangerous to our rights; accordingly, the 
Seventeenth Amendment should have increased the protection of our liberties.  Yet that 
conclusion contradicts Greve’s own view.  See, e.g., id. at 181–82 (associating federalism’s 
failure with the Progressive and New Deal Movements).  Admittedly, though, that 
dissonance may have more to do with the Senate’s allotted degree of independence from the 
states.  See generally Section II.C.2. 
218 See Zywicki, supra note 131, at 166-67.  For a list of examples, see supra note 161. 
219 See, e.g., ROSSUM, supra note 8, at 1–3 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s New 
Federalism is in error because federalism depended on state “vigilance” through their 
Senators). 
220 See Ilya Somin, When Ignorance Isn’t Bliss, in POLICY ANALYSIS 2 (Sept. 22, 2004), 
available at http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa525.pdf. 
221 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 3 (U.S. 1776) (referring to King George III 
as a “Tyrant” who is unfit to rule the American people). 
222 The credit for coining the phrase appears to go to Tocqueville.  TOCQUEVILLE, supra 
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The founders, like most people today, believed 
wholeheartedly in majority rule (although they, like us, reasonably 
disagreed on what degree of consensus is required, and for what types 
of decisions).223  However, the founders, perhaps unlike most people 
today, were not fond of democracy.224  They chose to elect Senators 
by state legislatures because they believed this would result in (1) a 
body of distinguished men225 (2) that was removed enough from the 
people (and the states) that it could serve as a check on the 
vacillations of democracy.  This section recounts the historical 
debates regarding each of those points in turn. 
1. Distinguished Men 
Returning to Dickinson’s motion before the Committee of the 
Whole, we learn that Dickinson quickly explained his proposal for 
state legislature election of Senators with “two reasons.”226  The first 
focused on the presumed constituency of such elections—it invoked 
the states’ information-collecting ability,227 as discussed 
previously,228 but the second focused on the elected: 
[H]e wished the Senate to consist of the most 
distinguished characters, distinguished for their rank 
in life and their weight of property, and bearing as 
strong a likeness to the British House of Lords as 
 
note 29, at 239–42.  But the Framers knew the concept well.  See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 
10, supra note 133, at 77 (“[M]easures are too often decided . . . by the superior force of an 
interested and overbearing majority.”). 
223 See, e.g., Notes of James Madison (Aug. 29, 1787), in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 449 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937) [hereinafter 2 FARRAND’S] 
(statement of Charles Pinckney) (proposing that laws relating to the regulation of commerce 
require a two-thirds majority of each House). 
224 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 133, at 81.  Note that those who 
subscribe to a distinction between democracy and majority rule do not find a contradiction 
therein.  See, e.g., TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 29, at 239–42. 
225 Notes of James Madison (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 150 (statement of John 
Dickinson).  It goes without saying that most people today would find the Framers’ vision 
somewhat flawed for its exclusion of women from voting and government leadership.  
Although they envisioned Senators as the wisest men among us, our citizenry has long since 
learned that the Senate is only wisest when it includes our greatest women as well.  The filter 
of election by state legislatures is just as compatible with our, more enlightened view as it 
was with theirs. 
226 See id. 
227 See id. 
228 See supra notes 189–201 and accompanying text. 
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possible; and he thought such characters more likely to 
be selected by the State Legislatures, than in any other 
mode.229 
The reader would not likely be surprised to learn that Dickinson’s 
opinion provoked disagreement, but the reader may be surprised to 
learn that the point of disagreement had little if anything to do with 
the desire for “distinguished characters” and more to do with whether 
state legislatures were the right medium for fulfilling that desire. 
As to the first point, Dickinson did not explain at the time 
why he wished for distinguished Senators, but his colleagues were 
quick to expound on that hope.230  Elbridge Gerry231 referred to the 
process as a “refinement” and viewed it as a means of separating out 
the interests of the landed class with those of the commercial.232  And 
in case the implication of protecting the interests of the rich is too 
subtle at first, Gerry later clarified that the commercial interest was 
synonymous with the “monied interest.”233  With that opinion (which 
others shared) out in the open though, we can now view it more 
closely.  Gerry and others234 recognized that the majority of 
 
229 Notes of James Madison (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 150 (statement of John 
Dickinson). 
230 As mentioned, several aspects of the Senate are beyond the scope of this paper, 
including membership numerosity.  See supra note 38.  The debate on keeping the Senate 
small, and thus less prone to the volatility of large decision bodies, intertwined with the 
debate on electing refined Senators.  See, e.g., Notes of James Madison (June 7, 1787), supra 
note 38, at 151 (statement of James Madison). 
231 Gerry ultimately elected not to sign the Constitution.  Notes of James Madison (Sept. 
17, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S, supra note 223, at 648–49.  Indeed, among other concerns, he 
ultimately found the Senate to be too aristocratic.  See Notes of James Madison (Aug. 14, 
1787), in 2 FARRAND’S, supra note 223, at 285-86.  Still, his concern was never specific to 
the mode of election but the combination of other factors (e.g., term length and inability for 
states to recall senators).  See id. 
232 Notes of James Madison (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 152 (statement of Elbridge 
Gerry). 
233 See id. at 154 (statement of Elbridge Gerry); see also POLE, supra note 39, at 170 
(finding the Senate to “subtly incorporate[] undertones of class”). 
234 See Notes of James Madison (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 154 (statement of Roger 
Sherman) (agreeing that election by state legislatures was far more likely to produce “fit 
men” than direct, popular election in larger districts, per Wilson’s proposal).  Oliver 
Ellsworth’s support was also strong.  Ellsworth actually rejected the notion that state 
legislative election of Senators would make Senators any more representative of state 
interests (he assumed citizenship was sufficient to engender such representation), yet he 
believed that mode necessary because it was more likely to result in wise senators.  See 
Notes of James Madison (June 25, 1787), supra note 41, at 406 (statement of Oliver 
Ellsworth). 
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American citizens were cash-poor and often in debt.235  Accordingly, 
the majority, when left to its own devices, would vote to (1) 
redistribute wealth, supplementing its lack of cash, and (2) inflate the 
currency, easing the ability to repay its debts.236  The minority of 
citizens, who tended to be the wealthier creditors, could not depend 
on raw voting power to protect their property.  This is not to say that 
Gerry and others rejected the concept of majority rule.237  Consider 
his exact words: “The elections being carried thro’ this refinement, 
will be most likely to provide some check in favor of the commercial 
interest agst. the landed . . . .”238  Unless “refinement” is code for 
“corruption,” Gerry did not intend to thwart the majority’s will.  
Rather, he wanted a refined body to provide a “check,”239 to provide 
feedback to the majority on the long-term ramifications of their 
proposal and to slow down the process long enough for cool 
consideration.240  In regard to inflation, a salient concern due to the 
 
235 See Notes of James Madison (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 152 (statement of 
Elbridge Gerry). 
236 See id. at 154–55 (statement of Elbridge Gerry) (distinguishing between the people, 
who were in favor of paper money, and the state legislatures, which were against it). 
237 Their conception of property rights would probably have considered some laws out of 
bounds per se, whether preferred by a majority or not.  See Locke, supra note 47, at 163 
(arguing that taxes must be authorized by the consent of the majority, or else the sovereign 
violates natural laws of property). 
238 Notes of James Madison (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 152 (statement of Elbridge 
Gerry). 
239 However, Robert Yates’ recollection of Gerry’s speech is somewhat different.  Yates 
records Gerry’s opining that the election by state legislatures would provide the commercial 
interest “better represent[ation].”  Notes of Robert Yates (June 7, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S 
RECORDS, supra note 38, at 157.  The statement is particularly condemning because it does 
not refer to representation of the commercial interest’s views or desires but of the interest 
itself, which implies a greater proportion of merchant-friendly Senators in the Senate than 
merchants in the population.  If this was Gerry’s intent, then the foundation for his argument 
is much weaker.  See Notes of Rufus King (June 7, 1787), supra note 100, at 158 (statement 
of James Madison) (arguing that a national government is distinct from a confederation and 
must abandon the notion that the Senate represents only the “Wealth of the nation”).  To be 
fair, though, his concerns about debtors’ shortsightedness were justified—a deadly mob had 
recently terrorized his home state in a movement now known as Shays’ Rebellion.  See 
generally STEWART, supra note 77, at 11–15 (summarizing the Rebellion’s motives and 
violence).  But distorting the minority’s representation in a proportionally represented body 
(which was the proposal on the table at that point, see Notes of James Madison (June 7, 
1787), supra note 38, at 151 (statement of James Madison) seems a rough and perverse way 
to protect their rights.  Our Framers wisely chose a host of sounder structural checks to 
accomplish that purpose, including the Presidential veto, judicial review, and super-majority 
voting requirements for constitutional amendments. 
240 In this, Gerry’s vision was no different from that of James Madison.  See Notes of 
James Madison (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 151 (statement of James Madison) 
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states’ paper money rage,241 Gerry likely had in mind a refined Senate 
to remind debtors that creditors need a return on investment in real 
dollars, and the result of inflation is not cheating debts but higher 
interest rates and, if the uncertainty surpasses a certain threshold, 
frozen credit markets.  In other words, the Senate’s role would be to 
engage in a dialogue with the majority to aid in looking past 
momentary desires and discovering their true will.242  Otherwise, 
Congress would become an instrument of oppression against the 
minority.243 
Gerry’s sentiments fleshed out Dickinson’s initial reference to 
the House of Lords.  That body, too, was composed of distinguished 
men—specifically the nobility and clergy.  These distinct interests 
stood as barriers to the ability of the Commons to tax and oppress the 
minority at will.244  But the analogy had obvious limits, and it was 
left to James Wilson to articulate them: Britain’s government 
presupposed certain laws (such as primogeniture), culture, and most 
obviously, a nobility.245  To be clear, though, Wilson rejected only 
the idea of basing the Senate on an aristocratic constituency; he 
readily concurred that Senators ought to be “men of intelligence & 
uprightness.”246 
 
(describing the Senate as one that would review proposed laws with “more coolness” than 
the House). 
241 See id. at 154 (statement of James Madison).  See generally STEWART, supra note 77, 
at 20–21 (describing the country’s currency problems). 
242 See Notes of James Madison (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 154 (statement of 
Elbridge Gerry) (arguing that the legislatures, and thus their elected Senators, are more 
restrained by their “sense of character” than are the people). 
243 See id. at 152 (statement of Elbridge Gerry). 
244 See Notes of Robert Yates (June 7, 1787), supra note 239, at 156–57 (statement of 
John Dickinson) (describing the houses of Parliament as “mutual checks on each other,” 
which promote the country’s “real happiness and security”). 
245 See Notes of James Madison (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 153 (statement of James 
Wilson); see also HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 123 (“The states were left to determine their 
own ‘natural aristocracy’ . . . .”); POLE, supra note 39, at 168 (“[T]he [Virginia] senate 
lacked a natural constituency; the question could be generalized for America.”). 
246 Notes of James Madison (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 153–54.  When the 
Convention later debated the Committee’s proposed mode of election, Charles Pinckney 
gave a lengthy speech distinguishing between Britain’s need for a House of Lords and 
America’s need for a refined Senate.  See Notes of James Madison (June 25, 1787), supra 
note 41, at 399–404.  Oddly, though, it appears that he concluded that speech by 
reintroducing a plan, see Notes of Robert Yates (June 25, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, 
supra note 38, at 412 (statement of Charles Pinckney), he had proposed earlier to the 
Committee, compare id. (statement of Nathaniel Gorham) (considering Pinckney’s plan 
because it departed from proportional representation to a degree), with The Pinckney Plan, 
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Nevertheless, Wilson (and Madison) had a yet stronger 
argument that state legislative election was unwise.  If state 
legislatures were guilty of yielding to the people’s temporary fervors, 
and subjecting the commercial class to the landed one, then they were 
incapable of electing Senators who could constrain those same 
fervors.247  As stated, the argument does not demonstrate the 
superiority of the people as the electorate, but Madison did so by 
making a further factual contention: the legislatures had inflated 
paper currency, at times, without the people’s encouragement.248  If 
such was the case, then popular election in large districts was the 
superior mode.249 
The Committee, and later the Convention, sided with 
Dickinson and Gerry—election of Senators by state legislatures was 
most likely to result in a distinguished, cool-headed second house.  
The ratifiers could now debate the topic. 
Some opponents of the Constitution were appalled by the 
aristocratic nature of the Senate.  The Framers had found it easy to 
discuss the House of Lords and a potential American analog, but they 
belonged to the inner circles that could populate such a house.  The 
public did not share that background, and Anti-Federalists 
sarcastically exposed the Framers’ intent to the public.250  The tactic 
 
reprinted in 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 185, appx. D; Notes of James Madison (June 
7, 1787), supra note 38, at 155 (statement of Charles Pinckney) (proposing to divide the 
Senate into three classes in which the largest was represented by three Senators, the middle 
by two, and the smallest by one), which elected Senators by the House of Representatives so 
they would be more “permanent & independent,” see id.; The Pinckney Plan, supra, appx. D, 
at 596, 605. 
247 See Notes of Madison (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 154 (statement of James 
Wilson); see also id. (statement of James Madison). 
248 See id. at 154 (statement of James Madison).  Gerry specifically refuted this factual 
claim and contended that, if either side had ever stood against the allure of debasing the 
currency, it was those states that had an aristocratic second branch.  See id. at 154-55 
(statement of Elbridge Gerry). 
249 See id. at 154 (statement of James Wilson) (arguing that election by the people in large 
districts was “most likely” to elect the most able Senators). 
250 See Centinel I, supra note 113, at 60 (supposing that Senators will be “the better sort, 
the well born, &c”(emphases removed)); Letter IV from the Federal Farmer to the 
Republican (Oct. 12, 1787), in Observations Leading to a Fair Examination of the System of 
Government Proposed by the Late Convention; and to Several Essential and Necessary 
Alterations in It, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 85, at 249 
(same).  Interestingly, not all Anti-Federalists focused their efforts on the Senate’s election 
mode.  In what is now known as the Cornelius Letter, Cornelius argues that the size of the 
House’s electoral districts will result in Representatives who favor the merchant class.  See 
Cornelius, supra note 179, at 143.  Senate elections are less troublesome, then, because each 
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was fair game, but it raised an interesting quandary: the Framers 
needed to convince the people that a significant threat to liberty was 
the people themselves—that’s not easy to swallow.  Indeed, it was a 
smack in the face for a people that through bloodshed had recently 
earned the right to govern themselves.  The Constitution’s 
proponents’ success depended, in part, on their ability to underscore 
the importance and impact of the moment.251  Here was a chance to 
show that the American people could unite and make hard choices 
that would bless their lives and those of their posterity.252 
The opponents’ more principled argument was that mode of 
election, combined with other aspects, removed the Senate too far 
from the people.253  They argued that the Senate was destined to 
become a “permanent aristocracy.”254  If well founded, the concern 
was valid.255  Unlike Britain with its House of Lords, and in line with 
Wilson’s argument at the Convention,256 America had no nobility to 
comprise a permanent, elected body as of right: the people were 
 
state legislator’s district would be much smaller.  See Kenyon, supra note 27, at 13. 
251 See HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 136 (“The notion that every citizen ha[s] an equal, and 
thus direct, voice in commanding the government has been the most consistent and perhaps 
the strongest force for change in American history . . . .  Not since 1787 ha[s] there been a 
group of statesmen sufficiently capable of persuading the American people otherwise.”). 
252 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 1, supra note 5, at 33 (“[I]t seems to have been reserved to 
the people of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide the important question, 
whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from 
reflection and choice . . . .”).  See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, 1 WE THE PEOPLE 6–7 (1991) 
(describing the general difficulty associated with marshaling the people for constitutional 
decision-making).  Hamilton tried a different tack in a later Paper, in which he treated the 
people’s ability to err as common public knowledge, almost as if to persuade those who 
disagreed that they had long since lost the argument.   See THE FEDERALIST NO. 71, at 432 
(Alexander Hamilton). 
253 See Centinel I, supra note 113, at 60–61. 
254 Id. at 61 (emphasis removed); see also Kenyon, supra note 27, at 27 (“[M]ost Anti-
Federalists feared the Senate more than the President . . . .”). 
255 Although many Framers had borrowed the House of Lords as a model for the Senate, 
few of them supported a permanent Senate.  Madison later wrote that such a concept was 
“repugnant to the genius of America,” THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, supra note 89, at 385, and 
even Elbridge Gerry eventually became disillusioned with Senators’ term lengths and ability 
to serve consecutively for life, see supra note 231.  The small group that advocated for a 
permanent aristocracy (during “good behavior”) included Alexander Hamilton, see Notes of 
James Madison (June 18, 1787), supra note 81, at 291 (statement of Alexander Hamilton), 
Charles Pinckney (whose position, again, seemed to contradict a later monologue, see supra 
note 246), see Notes of James Madison (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 155 (statement of 
Charles Pinckney), and George Read, see Notes of James Madison (June 25, 1787), supra 
note 41, at 409 (statement of George Read). 
256 See supra notes 245–246 and accompanying text. 
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sovereign.  Thus, distinguished Senators were only useful to the 
degree that they actually refined the majority’s temporary passions 
into its true will;257 a totally insulated Senate was far more likely to 
replace the will of the majority with its own will. 
The objection required significant treatment.  First of all, the 
objection alleged that the sum of all the Senate’s characteristics 
resulted in a permanent aristocracy, so proponents sometimes 
defended the propriety of each characteristic separately.258  Second, 
the effects of electing Senators by state legislatures are varied and 
many (this Note only focuses on the bicameral effects and still only 
addresses some), so justifications for the mode of election needed to 
be equally so.259  Some of these various arguments were described 
earlier among the objections to bicameralism generally,260 and some 
have yet to be.261  For now, though, it’s appropriate to review 
responses to the objection that “distinguished” Senators, chosen 
through state legislative election, would be too far removed from the 
people.262 
 
257 I find the argument strongest when limited to the aristocratic minority’s ability to hold 
up the majority in passing legislation.  Centinel apparently thought the Senate would be able 
to go one step further by forcing inferior legislation into law.  See Centinel II, supra note 
114, at 86.  James Wilson responded to this claim with the obvious rejoinder that the House 
of Representatives provided a means for the people to check such measures (and the 
President’s veto provided a second check).  See James Wilson, Speech Regarding Centinel’s 
Critiques at a Public Meeting (Oct. 6, 1787), in 1 DEBATE, supra note 58, at 66; cf. THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 63, supra note 89, at 388 (arguing that, in order for a corrupt Senate to reign 
in tyranny, it would need to corrupt also the state legislatures, the House of Representatives, 
and the people themselves).  Centinel rejected Wilson’s argument because he thought the 
House (and President) would be beholden to the power of the Senate and thus an insufficient 
check.  See Centinel II, supra note 114, at 86–87.  The argument is that Congress will rig 
elections that result in a House that is indifferent to the people, but this suffers from 
circularity in that it assumes an indifferent House that permits the rigging of elections in the 
first place.  See id. 
258 See, e.g., supra note 179 (introducing some literature on the debate over term length 
and rotation out of office). 
259 As mentioned earlier, one such effect was an augmented federalism, which various 
modern-day scholars have addressed, referring to historical debates along the way.  See 
supra note 161. 
260 To review briefly those objections, see supra notes 113–114 and accompanying text, 
and to review some of the Federalists’ responses, see supra notes 115–127 and 
accompanying text. 
261 See infra notes 310–337 and accompanying text. 
262 The focus of this Note on bicameralism limits the universe of worthwhile responses.  
Note, though, that the founding generation recognized a host of reasons for establishing a 
distinguished Senate that reached beyond augmentation of bicameralism, including that 
branch’s role in foreign affairs.  See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 64, supra note 91, at 390 
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Madison provided both a direct and general response.263  His 
direct response was that history proved the critics wrong.  He referred 
critics to the example of Britain.264  The House of Lords also sought a 
“distinguished” membership.265  Indeed, the example even stacks the 
deck in the objectors’ favor: that House was hereditary, permanent, 
and stocked with actual nobility.266  Surely, then, this permanent 
aristocracy proved the evils of the proposed Senate.267  In fact, the 
result had been exactly the opposite: “Unfortunately, however, for the 
anti-federal argument, the British history informs us that this 
hereditary assembly has not been able to defend itself against the 
continual encroachments of the House of Representatives . . . .”268  
The popular branch of Parliament, as the ratifying generation well 
knew, had entirely overtaken the power of the Lords.269  Accordingly, 
the American Senate, which would temper its desire for 
“distinguished” characters with term lengths and actual elections, was 
far more likely to be overtaken by the first House than vice versa. 
Madison’s general response was a defense of representative 
government.  He rejected wholesale the notion that representatives’ 
votes should reflect the outcome of a vote by the entire 
constituency.270  Representatives, then, are not simply proxies whose 
occupation derives solely from the inefficiencies of referenda.  Their 
 
(stating that election by state legislatures will ensure Senators who are “best qualified” for 
making treaties). 
263 Madison was not the only proponent to rebut the objection.  Noah Webster responded 
with a mild form of denial.  See A CITIZEN OF AMERICA, supra note 58, at 135 (arguing that 
the Senate will not be “composed of a different order of men”).  To be fair, though, he was 
trying to distinguish Senators from Europe’s nobility, see id. at 134–35; Webster earlier 
praised the age qualifications and term lengths of Senators because these would lead to wise, 
experienced, respectable men who were “not liable to the bias of passions that govern the 
young,” id. at 132.  Another response of that era praised the Constitution’s focus on a 
Senator’s merits—a stark contrast from the focus on parentage and wealth in the House of 
Lords.  See An American Citizen (Pseudonym for Tench Coxe) II, IND. GAZETTEER (Phil.), 
Sept. 28, 1787, reprinted in 1 DEBATE, supra note 58, at 25–26. 
264 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, supra note 89, at 388-89, 91. 
265 See id. 
266 Id. 
267 See id. 
268 Id. at 389 (emphasis added). 
269 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, supra note 89, at 388-89, 91; cf. id. at 389–90 (surveying 
a few other historical examples in which the popular branch dominated the other). 
270 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 133, at 82 ( (“[I]t may well happen that the 
public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the 
public good than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for the purpose.”). 
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purpose instead is to “refine and enlarge the public views.”271  That 
is, representatives are to gather the opinions of their constituents, like 
a proxy would, but not automatically vote as the majority (or 
plurality) of constituents would.272  Rather, they are to “refine” those 
views by purging them of biases and prejudices that taint them.  And 
they are to “enlarge” those views by exposing the long-term and 
wide-ranging effects of each.  Such a mandate requires wisdom.273  In 
later papers, Madison argued that senatorial election by state 
legislatures will produce wise Senators.274  And because of their 
wisdom, senators present an ideal, specific application of the general 
principles of proper representation.275 
Madison recognized, though, that a Senator might soon forget 
the constituency and prefer his or her own opinion in every case.276  
He wrote several counterpoints to assuage that very concern.277  But 
the most important response, in my view, derives simply from the 
way Madison stated the problem, that these deceivers “first obtain the 
suffrages, and then betray the interests of the people.”278  If Senators 
obstinately continue to assure constituents that their view is in fact a 
more refined one, and the unworthy just need time to recognize that 
truth, then their inferiors have the very real ability to remove them 
from office by seeking redress from the state legislature.279 
 
271 Id. 
272 Madison later surveyed the reputedly best historical senates and notes that these shared 
the legislative power with the people in some direct capacity.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, 
supra note 89, at 386–87.  For this reason, he argued, the American Senate, which fully 
excluded the people from governing in their collective capacity, will have the “most 
advantageous superiority.”  Id. at 387.  Note, though, that he qualified the contention based 
on the country’s size.  See id.  See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 133, at 83–
84 (making his famous argument that a larger country would actually create too diverse a 
mix of interests for any one faction to dominate). 
273 See id. at 82 (stating that the legislature’s “wisdom may best discern the true interest of 
their country”). 
274 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, supra note 90, at 377 (writing that the mode of election 
will “favor[] a select appointment”). 
275 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, supra note 89, at 384 (describing again the refinement 
process—this time with the Senators, a “respectable body of citizens,” as the refiners). 
276 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 133, at 82; cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 71, supra 
note 252, at 433 (“The representatives of the people, in a popular assembly, seem sometimes 
to fancy that they are the people themselves . . . .”). 
277 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 133, at 82–84. 
278 Id. at 82 (emphasis added). 
279 Without doubt, the process is a slow one, but this is by design.  The time lag provides 
us, the electorate, the chance to consider whether a Senator is being obstinate or wise.  See 
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Beyond his methodical responses to the objection of an 
aristocratic Senate, Madison added a novel, positive argument worth 
our consideration.  The point surfaces during a related argument that 
America’s need for respect among foreign nations280 is best met by a 
“select” (and stable) Senate designed for that purpose.281  Amidst that 
discussion, Madison mentioned that the “select” Senators’ familiarity 
with foreign laws and customs will provide an impartial guide 
domestically when Congress legislates on tough or novel issues.282  
Herein lies a device for protection of the people’s liberty: Senators 
chosen by state legislatures will ensure laws that promote the public 
good because they will judge those measures against, not only their 
own wisdom, but the accumulated wisdom of other nations.283 
Madison and his comrades were ultimately successful in 
convincing the people of the need for a distinguished Senate that 
could refine public views and promote the good of society. 
 
infra Section II.C.2.  Until then, an allegedly rogue Senator is, of course, unable to force 
personal views into law.  See supra note 257.  And Madison argues that the size of our 
country will lead to few such instances in the first place.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra 
note 133, at 82 (arguing that America’s large population entails a larger pool from which to 
choose its representatives, which in turn entails “a greater probability of a fit choice”). 
280 Although the theme of foreign affairs recurred throughout the debates over the Senate, 
see supra notes 91–92, 262 and accompanying text, the arguments justifying America’s need 
to establish herself among her foreign peers are beyond the scope of this Note.  John Jay, a 
legend in the field of foreign relations, addressed this topic early and thoroughly in The 
Federalist Papers.  See generally THE FEDERALIST NOS. 2–5 (John Jay). 
281 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, supra note 89, at 382. 
282 See id. 
283 In the wake of Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 
551 (2005), and the backlash against the internationalist perspective in those and similar 
cases, see, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 608 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598 
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Ernesto J. Sanchez, A Case Against Judicial Internationalism, 38 
CONN. L. REV. 185, 188–90 (2005); Janella Ragwen, The Propriety of Independently 
Referencing International Law, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1407, 1430–34 (2007) (detailing some 
of the backlash), perhaps Madison’s comments are controversial.  In my view, though, 
Madison’s suggestion is significantly distinct from the criticized approach of Roper and its 
ilk.  First, Madison’s discussion bears no relation to judicial methods; he suggested that a 
legislator can benefit from considering the views of other nations before passing laws that 
might tread on the rights of the people.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, supra note 89, at 382.  
Second and relatedly, a legislator’s consideration of foreign views only impacts the public if 
that consideration results in some form of prospective codification, subject to the 
constitutional requirements of bicameralism, presentment, and other requirements.  The 
argument seems entirely independent of an interpretation process that approaches an already 
enacted text and retroactively modifies it to fit perceived contemporary values. 
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2. Independence from the People (and the 
States) 
The first delegate to criticize John Dickinson’s proposal for 
state legislature election of the second branch was Charles 
Pinckney.284  From the average reader’s viewpoint, though, his 
criticism might seem odd: Pinckney argued that the proposal was 
faulty because it would result in too many Senators285 (by his 
calculations, at least eighty).286  He neither explained his reasons for 
desiring a small Senate, nor even acknowledged the fact that he was 
assuming one to be beneficial.287  More odd still is the fact that 
Dickinson’s subsequent response, although in disagreement, made no 
mention of Pinckney’s point being unfounded or novel;288 and the 
next two speakers (Hugh Williamson and Pierce Butler) appear to 
agree entirely with Pinckney’s premise.289  It was not until Madison’s 
response to Dickinson that the unstated assumptions of the previous 
speakers emerged.  A small Senate was desirable because it accorded 
with the Senate’s purpose—cool deliberation of the people’s often 
hasty proposals.290  Through that paradigmatic view of the Senate, 
Pinckney’s and so many other comments come into focus. 
 
284 See Notes of James Madison, (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 150 (statement of 
Charles Pinckney). 
285 As a reminder, the Framers at this point viewed the Senate through the lens of 
proportional representation.  See supra note 105.  Thus, Pinckney began his comment by 
positing the minimum possible representation ratio, i.e., the smallest state be represented by 
one Senator, and calculated the number of Senators who would then be allotted to the 
remaining states based on their populations.  See Notes of James Madison, (June 7, 1787), 
supra note 38, at 150 (statement of Charles Pinckney). 
286 See Notes of James Madison, (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 150 (statement of 
Charles Pinckney). 
287 See id.  It’s possible that Madison’s note-taking is to blame for Pinckney’s laconic 
statement.  But this seems unlikely considering Yates’ and King’s omission of Pinckney’s 
statement entirely.  See Notes of Robert Yates (June 7, 1787), supra note 239, at 156; Notes 
of Rufus King (June 7, 1787), supra note 100, at 158.  Furthermore, even if Madison’s 
foreknowledge influenced the terse record, that fact still proves the point that the Framers 
understood the Senate to be a small, cool-headed, deliberative check on the larger, more 
passionate popular branch. 
288 See Notes of James Madison, (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 150 (statement of John 
Dickinson). 
289 See id. at 150–51 (statement of Hugh Williamson); id. at 151 (statement of Pierce 
Butler). 
290 See id. (statement of James Madison) (stating that cool deliberation was the “use” of 
having a senate in the first place). 
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The Convention’s baseline, the Virginia Plan,291 presumed an 
independent Senate.  It proposed a Senator’s term length in 
qualitative terms: “a term sufficient to ensure their independency.”292  
Election by state legislatures simply continued the paradigm by 
injecting a layer of elections between the people and Senators, 
thereby increasing the Senate’s independence.  Indeed, Dickinson’s 
explanation for his proposal was that it would “check the 
Democracy.”293 
Apart from Dickinson’s comment and Madison’s explicit 
explanation, most Framers seem to have taken it for granted that the 
Senate ought to be independent294 and that the mode of election was a 
means of establishing that independence.  Their debate centered less 
on the need for independence and more on the best election mode for 
attaining independence.  On one end of the spectrum stood Alexander 
Hamilton, a staunch critic of democracy.295  He advocated that the 
people elect electors to choose their Senators, but that the Senators 
serve for life.296  On the other end of the spectrum stood (as always) 
James Wilson, refusing to relent on the importance of the people 
electing their national leaders.297  But even he acknowledged the need 
for a steadier second branch298 and ultimately modified his proposal 
so that, as in Hamilton’s proposal, the people elected electors, who in 
turn elected Senators.299  In the middle were delegates like Madison, 
debating whether a state legislature was the best means of securing 
 
291 See supra notes 77–80 and accompanying text. 
292 Notes of James Madison (May 29, 1787), supra note 78, at 20.  It is interesting to note 
that the Committee of the Whole debated a number of years for the term but never so much 
as proposed that the actual requirement of independency be removed.  See Notes of James 
Madison (June 12, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 38, at 218–19.  It wasn’t 
until a few weeks later, after the Convention had settled on a term of six years, that striking 
the phrase was agreed upon without debate (though not unanimously).  See Notes of James 
Madison (June 25, 1787), supra note 41, at 408. 
293 Notes of Rufus King (June 7, 1787), supra note 100, at 158. 
294 See, e.g., Notes of James Madison, (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 155 (statement of 
Charles Pinckney). 
295 See, e.g., Notes of James Madison (June 18, 1787), supra note 81, at 291 (statement of 
Alexander Hamilton) (predicting that the “evils operating in the States [would] soon cure the 
people of their fondness for democracies”). 
296 See id. 
297 See Notes of Madison, (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 154 (statement of James 
Wilson). 
298 See id. (advocating popular election because it would yield “upright[]” Senators). 
299 See Notes of James Madison (June 25, 1787), supra note 41, at 406 (statement of 
James Wilson). 
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independency.  Madison was unconvinced that a constituency of 
states would result in an independent Senate when the states 
themselves had often indulged in the momentary demands of the 
people.300  Pinckney agreed with the benefits of independence301 but 
thought election by the House accorded better with first principles.302  
And some, like Oliver Ellsworth, were adamant that the state 
legislatures would do the job best.303 
The debate was largely an empirical one,304 but one can 
compare the theories.  Utilizing electors might result in more 
independent Senators because the electors would have little 
anticipated reward for adhering to the people’s wishes.305  Moreover, 
the Electoral College would dissolve after the election, leaving the 
Senators with no direct constituency to pander to.  State legislatures 
cannot claim either benefit: (1) the legislators’ career might be on the 
line for deviating from the people’s wishes,306 and (2) the legislatures 
were in constant existence, enabling them to influence continually the 
votes of Senators.  But the legislatures, on the other hand, processed 
so many popular requests that to think a particular legislator’s career 
was determined solely by his or her senatorial vote is incredibly 
 
300 See Notes of Madison, (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 154 (statement of James 
Madison).  Madison’s arguments were likely slanted by his overwhelming insistence on 
proportional representation in both houses of Congress, see supra note 105 and 
accompanying text.  A few days later, as the Committee debated term lengths, Madison was 
happy to point out that Maryland, as opposed to those states that popularly elected their 
legislature’s second house, provided a model of “stable & firm Govt.”  See Notes of James 
Madison (June 12, 1787), supra note 292, at 218–19 (statement of James Madison). 
301 See Notes of James Madison (June 25, 1787), supra note 41, at 400 (statement of 
Charles Pinckney). 
302 See id. at 403 (arguing that a Senate elected by any other means would have no “order” 
of society to represent). 
303 See Notes of Robert Yates (June 25, 1787), supra note 246, at 414 (statement of Oliver 
Ellsworth) (arguing that the states were more competent to choose Senators whose “weight 
and wisdom may check the inconsiderate and hasty proceedings of the first branch”). 
304 For a brief comparison of the Senate’s independence pre-and post-Seventeenth 
Amendment, see infra notes 344–352 and accompanying text. 
305 Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, at 412–13 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing that the electors 
of the President will be largely immune to corruption, in part, because they are chosen for 
the “temporary and sole purpose of making the appointment”).  But see Who Are the 
Electors?, NATIONAL ARCHIVES, http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/electoral-
college/electors.html (last visited Feb. 3 , 2015) (“Throughout our history as a nation, more 
than 99 percent of Electors have voted as pledged.”). 
306 Indeed, Madison’s doubts stemmed from evidence of this dependence.  See Notes of 
James Madison, (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 154 (statement of James Madison). 
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unlikely.307  Moreover, the benefits of an electoral college are 
debatable: (1) electors were to be capable, and presumably well-
known, men in the community,308 which means they had reputations 
on the line and could easily submit their loyal voting history as 
evidence of their own qualifications for a particular public office, and 
(2) the dissolution of the college removed any barrier that 
momentarily existed between the Senators and the people. 
For a multitude of reasons, the Committee was unanimous 
and the Convention largely convinced that electing the Senate by 
state legislatures was best.309  The more arduous task of convincing 
the people remained, and the people were not as quick to admit the 
follies of democracy. 
The ratifiers’ debate over an independent Senate, and the 
contribution of election by state legislatures to that independence, 
included by definition the objection of a too far removed Senate.310  
Anti-Federalists were opposed to the lodging of so much power in 
such an independent body.311 
The Framers had viewed this decision positively (although 
they certainly disagreed, at times strongly, about the degree of power 
and independence312) and, as mentioned, effectively assumed the 
virtues of such an intent;313 proponents of the ultimate proposal now 
needed to elaborate on the reasons for strengthening the Senate’s 
 
307 But see HOEBEKE supra note 8, at 109 (reporting that, prior to the Seventeenth 
Amendment, state legislature candidates pledged to vote for particular senatorial candidates); 
Riker, supra note 161, at 463 (same). 
308 Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra note 305, at 412 (describing presidential electors as 
“capable” men). 
309 See Journal (June 7, 1787), supra note 96, at 149 (Committee of the Whole’s 11-0 
vote); Journal (June 25, 1787), supra note 80, at 395 (Convention’s 9-2 vote). 
310 See text accompanying notes 253–257. 
311 See Republicus, supra note 113, at 167 (questioning the extensive powers of a body 
that is “independent of the people, not in any instance responsible to them”); see also 
Centinel I, supra note 113, at 60–61.  But see Kenyon, supra note 27, at 27 (reporting that 
Anti-Federalists did not propose direct election for the Senate and that many agreed on the 
Senate’s stability as a requirement for good government).  The Federal Farmer 
acknowledged and praised the cool deliberation that would pervade the Senate due to the 
independence derived from its mode of election but advocated for, among other changes, a 
reduction in term length to tone down the degree of independence.  See Federal Farmer XI, 
supra note 85, at 288.  Luther Martin actually promoted the independence of the Senate as an 
argument for the presidential veto’s dispensability.  See Martin, supra note 85, at 53–54. 
312 See supra note 231 (noting Elbridge Gerry’s ultimate dissatisfaction with the chosen 
degrees of power and independence). 
313 See supra text accompanying notes 284–290. 
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independence. 
Publius did not shrink from taking up the cause, and 
Madison’s Federalist Paper No. 63 is the best on-point example of 
the Federalist response.  The beginning of the Paper enumerates 
reasons that people (whether influenced by a temporary democratic 
delusion or not) would desire Congress to include a more stable 
branch, the most prominent of which is maintaining foreign 
relations.314  At the halfway point, though, Madison shifted gears: 
“Thus far I have considered the circumstances which point out the 
necessity of a well-constructed Senate only as they relate to the 
representatives of the people. . . .  [S]uch an institution may be 
sometimes necessary as a defense to the people against their own 
temporary errors and delusions.”315  The statement touched on two 
important themes.  First, and perhaps most important for overcoming 
the barriers a reader would naturally erect at the hint of anti-
democratic notions, Madison labels the people’s errors as 
“temporary.”316  He did not mean to suggest that the people are in 
need of a leader (read: tyrant) to correct their continual errors and 
direct their activities.  Rather, the image is more like a trusted friend 
whom the people empower to provide a sounding board, and even 
legislative bottleneck, in the heat of the moment.  Second, he 
reminded the reader that this structural choice, like all others, is a 
“defense” of the people’s natural rights.  The majority, of course, 
wishes for the defense of their rights, but in a hasty moment they may 
at times demand legislation that infringes on the rights of themselves 
or others.317  This is not to say that the majority’s will is 
 
314 For more on that discussion, see supra notes 280–283 and accompanying text.  The 
other general reason in the Paper’s first half is to locate responsibility in a stable branch, 
which the people can then hold accountable for bad (or good) decisions.  See THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 63, supra note 89, at 383–84. 
315 See id. at 384; cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 71, supra note 252, at 432 (arguing that the 
President will be able to promote the “public good” by “withstand[ing the people’s] 
temporary delusion[s]). 
316 The passage is rife with statements and tones that seek to subdue the defensive reader.  
See, e.g., id. (stating that, because readers are not “blinded by prejudice or corrupted by 
flattery,” they will not take offense at this necessary safeguard); id. (characterizing the 
influences that lead to democratic errors as “irregular passion” or, shifting the blame, “the 
artful misrepresentations of interested men”). 
317 See id. (stating that “[the people] themselves will afterwards be the most ready to 
lament and condemn” the measures they once requested); see also Barry Friedman, The 
Wages of Stealth Overruling (with Particular Attention to Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 
1, 57 (2010) (stating that the Framers instituted bicameralism because Madison recognized 
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nonauthoritative;318 rather, it is a reconceptualization of the definition 
of “will,” which Madison suggested to be the “cool and deliberate 
sense of the community.”319  The Senate’s ability to fill that 
institutional role was set forth in a rhetorical question: 
In these critical moments, how salutary will be the 
interference of some temperate and respectable body 
of citizens, in order to check the misguided career and 
to suspend the blow meditated by the people against 
themselves, until reason, justice, and truth can regain 
their authority over the public mind?320 
Democracy provides the guiding principle in that the people are 
naturally permitted to rule themselves, but republicanism provides 
the operating principle in that the people sometimes need a moment 
of pause as they issue rulings.  The Senate can provide that moment 
of pause, but only if it is sufficiently independent of the people such 
that Senators need not fear for their livelihoods (and perhaps more) 
while they ask the people to hold off on a particular measure.  The 
Senate’s independence derives from several measures that led to 
Madison’s descriptions of “well-constructed,” “temperate,” and 
“respectable,”321 one of which is a barrier between the people and 
their Senators, viz. the state legislatures. 
Madison later mentioned an actual example of his theory 
among the states—the senate of Maryland.322  He praised the lofty 
reputation of that state’s Senate and deemed its electoral process a 
successful experiment.323  But he omitted the background details, 
presumably because his audience knew them.  It fell then to Noah 
 
“the problem was the people” (emphasis added)). 
318 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, supra note 89, at 384 (agreeing that a necessary condition 
for free government is that the people’s will “ultimately prevail[s] over the views of its 
rulers”). 
319 Id. 
320 Id.; cf. A CITIZEN OF AMERICA, supra note 58, at 131 (praising bicameralism because 
either house can check the other if one “should appear to be under any undue influence, 
either from passion, obstinacy, jealousy of particular men, attachment to a popular speaker, 
or other extraordinary causes”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 133, at 82 (writing that 
wise representatives can parse through the people’s “temporary or partial considerations” 
and “discern the true interest of their country”). 
321 THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, supra note 89, at 384. 
322 See id. at 388–89.  For a description of the election process for Maryland’s Senate, see 
supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text. 
323 THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, supra note 89, at 388–89. 
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Webster to fill in the context. Webster explained that Maryland’s 
senate was largely spared the atrocities of the paper money rage 
thanks to its firm, independent Senate.324  The House of Delegates, 
Maryland’s popular branch, had passed a measure to issue £500,000 
in paper money,325 a law that Webster argued would have collapsed 
the economy.326  But the second branch obstructed the bill’s passage: 
“The senate, like honest, judicious men, and the protectors of the 
interests of the state, firmly resisted the rage, and gave the people 
time to cool and to think.”327  In time, the people relented, and the 
state was saved.328  Webster’s description aligns perfectly with 
Madison’s theory.329  The people, in the heat of the moment, 
proposed a measure that was not actually in their best interest.  The 
Senate, on the other hand, was sufficiently removed from the people 
(and elected through a refining process that sought out distinguished 
senators) such that it could consider the matter more calmly.  Note 
their yardstick: “the interests of the state.”  These senators did not 
prevent a measure to protect selfish interests; they prevented a 
measure that would have destroyed the constituency they had 
promised to protect.  And after the Senate had postponed the bill’s 
passage for some time, the heat of the moment passed, and the people 
realized their folly. 
Having illustrated the checking process, Madison now needed 
to respond to the concern that the risks of senatorial independence 
would not outweigh the benefits.  He first suggested that, based on 
the United States’ circumstances, American liberty is more at risk 
from “abuses of liberty” than it is from “abuses of power.”330  By 
“abuses of liberty,” Madison referred to the democratic evils just 
discussed.331  But this answer, as he recognized, is too general332: the 
 
324 See A CITIZEN OF AMERICA, supra note 58, at 133. 
325 Id. 
326 See id. (opining that “every shilling of specie would have been driven from circulation, 
and most of it from the state,” resulting in a “loss [that] would not have been repaired in 
seven years”). 
327 Id. 
328 See id. 
329 Webster goes on to cite Connecticut as a similar example, (A CITIZEN OF AMERICA, 
supra note 58, at 133), and to contrast it and Maryland with the lesser examples of 
Pennsylvania and the Continental Congress, both unicameral legislatures, see id. at 132–34. 
330 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, supra note 89, at 387–88 (emphases added). 
331 See id. at 387 (using the term in response to objections against his recently concluded 
discussion of the benefits of an independent Senate). 
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United States’ circumstances are the key.  The United States 
Constitution divides the power among so many branches that the 
Senate would need to corrupt the state legislatures,333 the House, and 
the people themselves to abuse its power successfully.334  This 
compartmentalization works to quarantine corruption so the people 
can eliminate it.  But most importantly of all, the House provides a 
proactive check because of its direct connection to the people.335  
Even if the Senate were to succeed in usurping power, the House 
 
332 See id. at 387–88. 
333 Throughout the debate on independence, one must keep in mind that nationalists were 
just as concerned with state legislatures corrupting their Senators.  See, e.g., HOEBEKE, supra 
note 8, at 45 (finding evidence that “Senate actions were ideally to be as free from state 
coercion as they would be from popular whims”); supra notes 247–249 and accompanying 
text (describing Madison’s and Wilson’s objections at the Convention).  Proponents of the 
Constitution continued to fall back on these arguments while defending Senators’ 
independence from the states (in addition to the people) through the omission of a recall 
despite lengthy terms and the potential for successive reelections.  Compare Livingston, 
supra note 179, at 791 (proposing among other things, that the state be able to recall their 
senators, and that senators only be permitted to serve for six years in any twelve-year 
period), Smith & Hamilton, supra note 179, at 803 (statement of Melancton Smith) (“As the 
clause now stands, there is no doubt that the senators will hold their office perpetually . . . 
.”), and id. at 805 (“When a state sends an agent commissioned to transact any business, or 
perform any service, it certainly ought to have a power to recall him.”) with Robert 
Livingston, Speech Responding to Gilbert Livingston’s Concerns at the New York Ratifying 
Convention (June 24, 1788), in 2 DEBATE, supra note 81, at 792–93 [hereinafter Robert 
Livingston] (arguing that because “[t]he state legislatures [are] frequently subject to factious 
and irregular passions . . . a senator may be appointed on one day and recalled the next”), 
and Smith & Hamilton, supra note 179, at 801–11 (statement of Alexander Hamilton) 
(providing examples of state legislatures that had indulged the people’s momentary frenzies 
and concluding, “[t]o prevent this, it is necessary that the senate should be so formed, as in 
some measure to check the state government”).  They argued that Senators, although state 
representatives, also represented national concerns to some degree.  See A CITIZEN OF 
AMERICA, supra note 58, at 139–40 (“A delegate is bound to represent the true local interest 
of his constituents . . . but when each provincial interest is thus stated, every member should 
act for the aggregate interest of the whole confederacy.” (emphasis in original)); Robert 
Livingston, supra, at 792 (“The senate are [sic] indeed designed to represent state 
governments; but they are also the representatives of the United States, and are not to consult 
the interest of any one state alone . . . .”).  See generally ROSSUM, supra note 8, at 95–102 
(outlining the rationale for denying states certain powers over Senators); Larry D. Kramer, 
Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 
215, 224 n.33 (2000). (“The Senate was designed from the start to serve contradictory ends: 
to protect state interest, but also to be a republican analogue to the House of Lords and take 
the longer, more ‘national’ view of policy.”); Riker, supra note 161, at 457–63 (describing 
the inefficacy of instructing senators without a sufficient substitute for recalling them). 
334 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, supra note 89, at 388. 
335 See id. at 389 (recounting that the British House of Lords was “crushed by the weight 
of the popular branch”); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 66, at 403–04 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(listing several counter-powers of the House). 
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would have the power and the guidance of the people in restoring free 
government.336  Thus, the Senate could never become a “permanent 
aristocracy.”337 
The ratifiers, in a truly extraordinary moment, ultimately 
embraced the notion of an independent Senate, elected by state 
legislatures.  That decision was a great boon to the protection of 
American liberties—at least until the people changed their minds. 
3. A Modern Assessment 
History vindicates the Framers’ intent.  Their choice for state 
legislatures to elect senators resulted in the precise outcomes they 
hoped for: distinguished Senators coolly deliberating laws in an 
independent branch. 
The Senate quickly gained a reputation as a chamber for 
distinguished men.  Recall from earlier the adulation bursting from 
Tocqueville in his description of that body.338  Among other terms, he 
referred to Senators as “celebrities,”339 for that is what they were.340  
But simply to populate a chamber with celebrities does little for the 
American people unless those distinguished representatives prove 
good governors.  It is a different passage from Tocqueville that 
 
336 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, supra note 89, at 389–90; cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, 
supra note 157, at 242 (explaining how every branch of government is elected by the people 
in some way).  C.H. Hoebeke argues the point thus: 
[I]n the event that the wisdom and probity of the Senate, like all things 
mortal, should temporarily subside, it would be checked by a coequal 
branch of the legislature, drawn in its immediate respects from an 
essentially different constituency.  In factious times, ‘the dissimilarity in 
the genius of the two bodies,’ each with a reciprocal hold on the other, 
reduced the likelihood that the same interests could gain the upper hand 
in both houses, and thus monopolize the legislative power for their own 
ambitions. 
HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 17; see also id. at 128 (“[L]est, in all these electoral intricacies, 
the popular will was lost from view, the entire apparatus could be brought to a halt by the 
House, whose members answered immediately to the people.”). 
337 Compare Centinel I, supra note 113, at 61 with THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, supra note 89, 
at 389 (“[T]he conclusive evidence resulting from this assemblage of facts [is] that the 
federal Senate will never be able to transform itself, by gradual usurpations, into an 
independent and aristocratic body . . . .”). 
338 See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text. 
339 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 29, at 191. 
340 William Riker uses resignation statistics to argue that the prestige of serving as a 
Senator grew over time.  See Riker, supra note 161, at 462–63. 
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captures this point: “[I]t suffices that the popular will pass through 
this chosen assembly for it to be worked over in some way, and it 
comes out reclothed in more noble and more beautiful forms.  The 
men so elected . . . represent only the elevated thoughts that are 
current in the midst of [the majority of the nation] . . . .”341  Due to 
the Senate’s mode of election, as Tocqueville surmised,342 Senators 
were the type of refined individuals who would filter out the people’s 
momentary passions.  Madison’s argument proved right.343 
Furthermore, the Senate indeed gained an important degree of 
independence such that it could deliberate coolly without immediate 
repercussion.  The very first Senators debated the weight that 
instructions carried and concluded it was very little.344  The states, 
realizing that perhaps they ought to have pressed harder for a recall 
power during ratification, scrambled to find means of influencing 
their Senators.345  That reaction alone suggests the Framers 
successfully insulated Senators to some degree. 
More historical evidence exists.  As C.H. Hoebeke reports, 
the Senate became a barrier to even popular legislation.346  House 
bills struggled to work themselves through senatorial committees, 
and those that did then likely faced a significant amount of debate on 
the Senate floor.347  He describes the lengthy period required for the 
Senate to agree finally to tariff reform in the decades immediately 
preceding the Progressive Movement’s rise.348  As Hoebeke explains, 
the Senators were rightly skeptical of calls for tariff reform from 
groups that had sung tariffs praises not too many years earlier.349  The 
Senate approached the measure cautiously, and the groups’ zealous 
 
341 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 29, at 192. 
342 See id. 
343 See Zvi S. Rosen, The Irony of Populism: The Republican Shift and the Inevitability of 
American Aristocracy, 18 REGENT U. L. REV. 271, 271 (2006) (arguing that the Seventeenth 
Amendment’s primary effect was the “diminution of the Senate” as an aristocratic body). 
344 See Riker, supra note 161, at 456–57.  Perhaps not surprisingly, the Senate was mostly 
comprised of Federalists.  See id. at 457. 
345 See id. (“Republicans and state legislatures alike searched for a better substitute [of 
recall than simply refusing to reelect disobedient Senators].”); see also id. at 457–62 
(describing the states’ search for a substitute through the late nineteenth century). 
346 See HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 116. 
347 See id. 
348 See id. at 117–19 (stating that “[d]uring twenty years of reform discussion, senators 
seemed willing to adopt the principle of reduction, except where their own constituents were 
concerned”). 
349 See id. at 118–19. 
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“devotion” to the principles of free trade diminished in the 
meantime.350  It appears that the Senate did not finally assent to 
proposed reforms until the measures commanded an actual majority 
of the people.351  It was Noah Webster’s account of the Maryland 
Senate352 writ large. 
On the other hand, Madison had also argued that the Senate’s 
independence would not lead to a usurpation of power.353  For one 
thing, Tocqueville himself observed that the people’s control over the 
state legislatures provided a satisfactory process for replacing truly 
obstinate Senators.354  More importantly, though, laws that 
represented the majority’s will (and not democratic passions) always 
overcame the Senate’s deliberative process.  As Hoebeke reports, 
“historians are at a loss to cite a single proposition, supported by 
persistent public opinion, which was ultimately defeated at the hands 
of the U.S. Senate.”355 
The Senate functioned exactly as intended.  By retarding the 
progress of legislation, Senators were able not only to debate the 
virtues of a bill but also provide the American people some time to 
reconsider.  Thus, the Senate was able to discern, and shape, the 
majority’s will.  Such a system does not quickly respond to the 
volatile wishes of the majority.  Indeed, the Seventeenth Amendment 
was likely a calculated first volley in the Progressive Movement’s 
fight for other governmental reform.356 
The democratization of the federal government is now the 
status quo.  Indeed, society now defines a republic differently than 
the Framers did.  Whereas the Framers emphasized representatives’ 
independence and refinement of ideas, most people today think 
representatives should simply vote with a majority of their 
 
350 See HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 119. 
351 See id. (explaining that the Senate’s shift paralleled the change in opinion of the 
manufacturing sector). 
352 See supra notes 324–329 and accompanying text. 
353 See supra notes 330–337 and accompanying text. 
354 See TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 29, at 192 (“The Senators . . . do represent the result, 
albeit the indirect result, of universal suffrage . . . .  [T]hey can always control [a state 
legislature’s] choice by giving it new members.”). 
355 HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 121. 
356 See id. at 110 (describing the Amendment as a “fundamental step” for Progressives); 
Zywicki, supra note 128, at 1011 (“[M]any aspects of the Progressive Era . . . may not have 
been possible without the institutional reform of the direct election of senators.”). 
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constituency.357  In the same breath, though, most are surprised to 
learn of the federal government’s massive infringement on our 
liberties.358  Repeal of the Seventeenth Amendment would increase 
the independence of the Senate.359  And that increased independence 
would better protect our liberties because it would sharpen the 
bicameral nature of Congress. 
An important counterargument on this front regards the 
practice of the states up until the Seventeenth Amendment’s passage.  
As William Riker points out, many states reformed their senatorial 
election procedures such that their Senators were effectively elected 
by popular vote.360  Indeed, during the first year of direct elections, 
all twenty-five Senators facing reelection prevailed.361  Thus, some 
scholars argue that repeal of the Seventeenth Amendment would have 
only a negligible effect.362  I have two responses.  First, several 
academics have praised the Senate’s federalism-mindset right up to 
the point of amendment.363  Indeed, at the time Congress debated the 
Amendment, at least some Senators were still reporting directly to 
state legislatures about their voting record.364  Second, the logic of the 
 
357 See, e.g., Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 565 (“[R]epresentative government is in essence self-
government through the medium of elected representatives of the people . . . .”). 
358 See, e.g., Jennifer Stisa Granick & Christopher Jon Sprigman, Op-Ed., The Criminal 
N.S.A., N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/28/opinion/the-
criminal-nsa.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1& (describing how the government has interfered 
into our privacy). 
359 Cf. Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside 
Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043, 1071 n.98 (1988) (“Repeal of the Seventeenth 
Amendment might help to . . . enhance national governmental deliberations.”); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 79 (1985) (“[T]he 
original constitutional framework was based on an understanding that national 
representatives should be largely insulated from constituent pressures.  Such insulation, it 
was thought, would facilitate the performance of the deliberative functions of government.  
That system of insulation has broken down with [, among other things], direct election of 
senators . . . .”). 
360 See Riker, supra note 161, at 463–67 (describing a progression that led up to the 
Oregon Plan and, ultimately, the Seventeenth Amendment). 
361 Zywicki, supra note 131, at 189. 
362 See, e.g., Amar, Indirect Effects, supra note 161, at 1360 n.51 (“[A]ny repeal of the 
Seventeenth Amendment, to be meaningful, would also have to disable States from enacting 
versions of the ‘Oregon Plan.’ ”); Somin, supra note 217, at 92 (“[A] straight-up repeal of 
the amendment would probably have little effect of any kind, since popular election of 
senators would persist in most states even if it were no longer constitutionally mandated.”). 
363 See, e.g., ROSSUM, supra note 8, at x (arguing that a Senate elected by state legislatures 
would never have enacted the New Deal legislation). 
364 See 46 CONG. REC. 2244 (1911) (statement of Sen. Elihu Root). 
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response can be reversed: if the Seventeenth Amendment’s repeal 
would have no effect, that suggests its passage did not either.  But if 
that were the case, it leaves unexplained the force behind a 
nationwide movement.365  Election by state legislatures must have 
been doing its job,366 even if not as purely as in early history of the 
Union.  And a repeal of the Seventeenth Amendment would return us 
to that time when liberties were better protected. 
III. CONCLUSION 
In the fervor that led up to the ratification of the Seventeenth 
Amendment, proponents of the proposal to directly elect Senators 
proffered a host of arguments in support of the change.  Each of these 
arguments was unsatisfying, but making poor arguments was not the 
Progressives’ worst mistake.  Their gravest error was to ignore the 
specific arguments of the Founders in favor of state legislature 
election and to presume themselves more worthy of structuring the 
federal government. 
This Article has argued that the Founders of our Union 
specifically intended for Senators to be elected by state legislatures 
because, among other reasons, it would result in a truly bicameral 
Congress that was less likely to infringe on the liberties of the people.  
Indeed, it was considered by them to be an auxiliary protection for 
the people in their relationship with the government.  The 
Seventeenth Amendment foolishly overruled that intent.  Thus, the 
logical outcome of this Article’s argument is that the Seventeenth 
Amendment ought to be repealed, and the founding generation’s 
intended structure restored. 
Unfortunately, the Seventeenth Amendment is itself only one 
example of society’s increasing forgetfulness of the Framers’ 
wisdom.  This trend, thankfully, has not reached the point of 
conscious disrespect for those great men—our debt to them for the 
liberty and freedom we enjoy is immense, and it would be a shame to 
ever forget that.  For now, the disrespect remains subconscious every 
 
365 See Zywicki, supra note 131, at 193 (“The unsolved puzzle for the advocates of the 
Progressive model . . . is to explain why the voters in one state cared how the voters in 
another state elected their Senators.”). 
366 Indeed, as mentioned above, the Seventeenth Amendment made possible a host of 
legislation that followed, see supra note 356 and accompanying text, which indicates the 
Senate continued to present a barrier of some type. 
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time we fail to accord their decisions due weight. 
The Founders faced great challenges in their day.  They 
fought a war against the most formidable country then on Earth and 
won; they studied, pondered, debated, and prayed as they laid out the 
design for a united republic, the likes of which the world had never 
seen; and they consciously worked to leave behind a world that was 
freer, and hence better, than they had found it.  It is only because of 
their efforts that the United States of America continues to enjoy such 
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